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RETHINKING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: LIMITING THE
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATIONS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
REx R. PERSCHBACHER*

[S]alutary as the basic principle of res judicata undoubtedly is, one of
its aspects in particular, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is an extraordinarily dangerous instrument. Over and over again it has been demonstrated that, in the use of this doctrine, courts must be alert to the
danger that its extension by merely logical processes of manipulation
may produce results which are abhorrent to the sense of justice and
to orderly law administration.'
INTRODUCTION

In 1978 Linda Gear's employment with the Des Moines, Iowa police
department was terminated. Gear claimed she was a victim of sexual harassment and discrimination: that police force personnel made sexual advances
toward her; that she was required to seek permission from her male superior
in order to use the restroom; that her work schedule was revised without notice;
and that the police chief fostered bias and prejudice toward women in the
department. The police department claimed Gear was fired because she
refused to report for scheduled duty on three occasionsY
Out of work, Gear applied to the Iowa Department of Job Service for unemployment benefits. When a claims deputy denied her benefits on the ground
that she voluntarily left work without good cause, Gear appealed and received
an evidentiary hearing under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act.3 The
hearing officer ruled against her. She did not pursue her unemployment compensation further. 4 She did, however, file suit in federal district court alleging
her discharge violated the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the fourteenth amendment. 5
*Acting Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, University of California at
Davis. A.B., 1968, Stanford University; J.D., 1972, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California - Berkeley. I want to thank my colleagues, Professors Floyd Feeney, James Hogan,
Friedrich Juenger, and Richard Delgado for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. I gratefully acknowledge the research and editorial assistance of Alan Ciamporcero,
Michael Laurence, Steve Peterson and Jon Sands in preparing this Article.
1. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L
REV. 281, 289 (1957).
2. Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218, 1219, 1223 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
3. Id. at 1220. The hearing guidelines are set out in Iowa Administrative Procedure
Act, IowA CODE § 17A (1977). Gear had the burden of establishing that she left her employment with good cause attributable to her employer under the Iowa Employment Security
Act, id. § 96.5(1). 514 F. Supp. at 1220.
4. 514 F. Supp. at 1220. The hearing officer's adverse ruling became final when Gear
failed to appeal to the department's appeal board in 15 days. State court judicial review was
also available. IowA CODE § 17A.19 (1977).
5. 514 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
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Gear's day in federal court was brief. The district judge reviewed the administrative hearing record and was "convinced that material facts actually
or necessarily adjudicated in the agency hearing form the sole predicate for
'6
[Gear's] constitutional challenge mounted in this Court."
Based on the administrative findings of the state unemployment compensation hearing, the
district court dismissed Gear's constitutional claims. 7 The court gave preclusive effect to the administrative determinations by invoking the common law
doctrine of collateral estoppel s
Unfortunately, Ms. Gear's case is not unique. Throughout the last forty
years, collateral estoppel has changed from a precisely defined and narrowly
applied doctrine9 to a vaguely defined idea widely used by harried courts. L0
6.

Id. at 1223.

7. Id. at 1224.
8. The "typical" application of collateral estoppel occurs when one of the parties to a
civil action argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues determined
in an earlier civil action between the same parties in the same jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs introduction at 2, 263-65 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)].
Modern approaches usually treat collateral estoppel (also known as "issue preclusion')
and res judicata (also known as "claim preclusion') together as two aspects of the effect
of prior adjudication on subsequent litigation. See generally RESrATEMENT (SECoND), supra
ch. 3; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CiviL PROCEDURE §§ 11.2-.4, 11.6-.27, 11.29-.30 (2d ed. 1977); IB
J. MOORE & T. CmuuRm, MOORE'S FRD
. PRAcncE,
0A05-A48 (2d ed. 1982); A. VESrAL,
RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION (1969); Developments in the Law -Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv.
818 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
This article will focus on applications of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. In addition to the sources cited above, this branch of the doctrine receives detailed treatment in
Polasky, CollateralEstoppel -Effects of PriorLitigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217 (1954); Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 165 (1969); and Scott, Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942).
9. Collateral estoppel was traditionally "expressed and implemented through a cluster
of axiomatic rules of law specific in form, absolute in force, and mandatory in application."
Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615,
616 (1980). The most widely known decisions using collateral estoppel involved closely
related cases. E.g., United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924) (successive suits for installments of retirement salary); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877) (successive suits
to collect on the same issue of bonds and attached coupons); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d
35 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (successive suits to collect series of promissory notes given as payment
for same legal services); Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 346 Il. 266, 178 N.E. 496
(1931) (two suits involving same parties arising out of the same automobile-bus collision
but with adversary positions reversed). See generally James, Consent Judgments as Collateral
Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1959); Developments, supra note 8 at 841.
10. This connection was explicitly recognized by Justice White in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Justice White stated:
[T]he abrogation of mutuality has been accompanied by other developments- such
as expansion of the definition of "claim" in bar and merger contexts and expansion
of the preclusive effects afforded criminal judgments in civil litigation - which enhance
the capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly.
Id. at 827-28. See also Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusionby Judgment: The Law Applied in
Federal Courts, 66 Mum. L. REv. 1723, 1724 (1968) ("Judges, overwhelmed by docket loads,
are looking for devices to expedite their work. Preclusion offers an opportunity to eliminate
litigation which is not necessary or desirable.'),
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Originally, collateral estoppel prevented relitigation only of factual issues that
were actually litigated and essential to an earlier judgment on a different cause
of action binding the same parties. In comparison, res judicata prevented relitigation of issues that might have been raised, but were not, following judgment on the same cause of action.:"

Recently a refashioned and broadened doctrine of collateral estoppel has
emerged with simplified formal requirements, best expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments."- Issues of either law or fact can be the basis
for collateral estoppel.13 Mutuality is no longer necessary; only the estopped
party need be bound by the prior determination.1 Nonjudicial bodies, particularly administrative agencies, can make this prior determination provided
they operate "in a judicial capacity."' 15 Only a party who lacked a "full and
11.

See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877). For a discussion of

Cromwell, see infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF JuDGMENTS,
§§ 41-77 introductory note & § 68 comment a (1942) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
Both res judicata and collateral estoppel required mutuality: only a party bound by
the first judgment could take advantage of that judgment in a second suit. Id. at § 93. In
order to be bound by a judgment, one had to be a party or in privity with a party to
the earlier action. Id. at § 93 comment b. The rules of privity were complex and subject
to a number of exceptions. See id. §§ 79-92. The "exceptions" were for the most part quite
detailed and specific. See id. §§ 94-111. A number of them were not truly exceptions at all.
See, e.g., id. § 94 (judgments against one of several tortfeasors or obligors generally not binding on others); § 103 (judgments generally not binding on co-owners of property); § Ill
(judgment as operative fact). The majority of the exceptions dealt with three generally accepted special rules: joint tortfeasors (§§ 94-99); joint promisors (§§ 101-02); and indemnity
and warranty relationships (§§ 106-08).
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 8, § § 27-29.
13. Id. § 27 and reporter's note. But see id. § 28(2) (special limitations on preclusion for
issues of law).
14. Id. § 29 and reporter's note. See also Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942). Since Bernhard, the clear trend has been abandonment of the mutuality requirement, although it remains unclear whether nonmutual collateral estoppel has become
the majority view. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, § 11.24, at 580.
Although the relative merits of the mutuality rule have been the subject of continuing and intense debate in the academic legal community, the weight of opinion appears

to be against the requirement of mutuality. See

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND),

supra note 8, § 29

and 298-300. The United States Supreme Court has approved both defensive and offensive
assertions of collateral estoppel without the mutuality rule. Compare Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (patent litigation -defensive)
with Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (securities litigation - offensive).
The distinction between offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel is based on the
strategic position of the parties in the second suit. When the litigant not a party to the
first suit seeks to use issue determinations from that suit to establish liability against a defending party the use of collateral estoppel is "offensive." When the litigant seeks to use
issue determinations from an earlier suit to which the litigant was not a party in order
to avoid liability, the use of collateral estoppel is "defensive." See id. at 326 n.4; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 8, § 29 comment d. Nevertheless, the mutuality rule continues to attract defenders. See, e.g., Note, A Probablistic Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612 (1978) (arguing that a demonstrable mathematical maldistribution of litigation risks results from abandoning the mutuality rule).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83 (administrative adjudications). In addition to administrative adjudications, decisions by arbitrators acting in a nonjudicial capacity
will be given collateral estoppel effect. Id. § 84 (arbitration awards). There is one additional
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fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in the first action is excepted from the
doctrine's operation.1- Courts and commentators have generally welcomed
this expansion of collateral estoppel7 as one way to deal with increasing caseloads."' Nevertheless, the Gear case and others like it suggest that some reexamination of collateral estoppel is in order.
This article first examines collateral estoppel in historical perspective,
identifying three categories of collateral estoppel. Each category is supported
in varying degrees by the goals of finality; avoidance of expense and vexation
in a multi-lawsuit context; and judicial economy. This article next discusses
giving collateral estoppel effect to administrative determinations. Here the
goals of judicial finality and avoidance of vexatious litigation are not ordinarily
present, and judicial economy is the sole justification for applying collateral estoppel. Distinctions will be drawn between cases in which collateral estoppel of
administrative determinations is necessary to implement res judicata objectives
qualification to using administrative and arbitral adjudications as collateral estoppel. See id.
§§ 88(4), 84(8) (collateral estoppel vill be used if not incompatible with legislative policy).
However, other general limitations on issue preclusion/collateral estoppel remain applicable.
Id. §§ 88 comment h, 84 comment f. This stand is in marked contrast to that taken by the
first Restatement which did not even deal with "the effect of the decisions of administrative

tribunals."

REsrATEMENT,

supra note 11, scope note. The first Restatements introductory

note suggests that whether decisions of administrative "tribunals" would be binding in later
controversies (without distinguishing between civil and agency proceedings) requires an
examination of (i) the character of the tribunal; (ii) the nature of its procedure; and (iii)
its authorizing legislation. These brief introductory remarks show a greater appreciation for
the difficulties inherent in giving collateral estoppel effect to agency decisions than do most
of the modem cases that simply accept such applications of the doctrine. See, e.g., People v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, appeal dismissed sub nom., Western
Air Lines v. California, 848 U.S. 859 (1954).

16. See generally

REsrATEMENT (SECOND),

supra note 8, § 29 and comment b and re-

porter's note.
17. But see The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) ("What
jural relevance facts may acquire in the future it is often impossible even remotely to
anticipate."), cert. denied, 823 U.S. 720 (1944); 1B J. MooRE & T. CuRIuER, supra note 8,
0.441; James, supra note 9, at 188; Developments, supra note 8, at 84142.
Judge Hand's recognition that the second suit could be extremely different from the first
seems to have led to his attempt in The Evergreens to limit collateral estoppel by requiring
that facts from the first suit be used only to establish "ultimate" facts in the second. 141 F. 2d
at 980-81. This particular attempt based upon a distinction between mediate data and
ultimate facts, although achieving some success in the courts, has been generally rejected
by the commentators. It was expressly rejected by the Restatement (Second) in favor of
asking "whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties as important and by
the adjudicator as necessary to the first judgment." RSTATEMNT (SECOND), supra note 8,
§ 27 reporter's note. See also id. comment j. The Restatement (Second) relaxes the rule
against relitigation of issues qualifying as collateral estoppel when the "issue is one of law"
and "the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated," id. § 28(2), and when
"it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would
arise in the context of a subsequent action." Id. § 28(5). See also id. § 28(2) (b).
18. The number of civil cases filed in the United States District Courts rose from
84,784 in 1940 to 54,622 in 1950; 59,284 in 1960; 87,321 in 1970; and a whopping 168,789
in 1980. These figures are from 1940, 1950, 1970, 1980 AD. OFF. ANN. REp. The story
behind them and their effect on the administration of justice in the federal trial courts
is set out in Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A Statistical Analysis of FederalDistrict
Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. Rv. 65 (1981).
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and those in which its use is largely a matter of the court's convenience. In the
latter cases, it is important to examine the context carefully to see if using
collateral estoppel is fair to both parties and necessary under all the circumstances. Finally, this article suggests an approach that denies administrative
decisions preclusive effect, but allows them to be introduced as evidence or in
other ways.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Despite the current perception of collateral estoppel as a branch of res
judicata,19 the two doctrines have independent origins in Anglo-American
law. Res judicata is a contribution of Roman law which provided that an
earlier adjudication was conclusive in a second suit involving the same central
issue and the same legal basis. 20 This principle rested upon the sanctity of the
final judicial pronouncement and ultimately became the doctrine of merger
and bar.

21

The origins of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, are Germanic. The
doctrine did not depend upon the existence of a final judgment. 2 Rather, it
was based on the idea that because the parties dominated the judicial proceedings, their acts in these proceedings created a true estoppel. 2 3 Gradually
this concept was transformed into a form of estoppel by record.24 Estoppel
by record was premised on the notion that the record was the best source
for discovering which determinations in the prior proceedings bound the parties.2 5 The determinations themselves, not the final judgment, were the source
19. Modern approaches usually treat collateral estoppel and res judicata together as two
aspects of the effect of prior adjudication on subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 329-30, 605 P. 2d 10,
12-13, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504-05 (1980). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 8;
F. JAMES & G. HAZARDsupra note 8, §§ l1.2-A, .6-.27, .29-.30; 1B J. MooRE & T. CURRIER, supra
note 8, T 0JA05-.448 (esp. I 0.A05 & 0A41); Developments, supra note 8, at 840.
20. See W. BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAw 690-92 (1921); Developments, supra
note 8, at 820.
21. Developments, supra note 8, at 820. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 45,
47, 48 and comments thereto. Res judicata doctrine has been part of English law since the
l100s. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L.
REv. 41, 44 (1940).
22. Millar, supra note 21, at 44. Early English commentators, including Coke, treated
res judicata and estoppel by record as fully distinct and unrelated. There was no mention
of any need for a judgment to effect an estoppel. No comparison was made between the
doctrines. Id. at 51.
23. Id. at 44-45, 53, 58-59.
24. For examples of true estoppel by record which barred an appellant from contradicting any fact in the record on appeal, see King v. Carlile, 109 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B. 1831)
(appellant could not contradict showing in the record that two justices were present when
verdict rendered); Molins v. Werby, 83 Eng. Rep. 305 (K.B. 1793) (no contradiction that
presiding officer was personally present).
25. Millar, supra note 21, at 45. Millar summarizes the distinction between early (1300s)
English res judicata and estoppel by record this way:
Where the second suit is clearly no more than a repetition, at least in substance, of
the former controversy (and on occasion, at least, even though the party roles are
reversed) it is the judgment itself in that first suit that stands as a barrier to the
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of the estoppel. Eventually, however, the sanctity and force of the judgment
entered here as well, and a final judgment was required to give the proceed28
ings preclusive effect.

This historical distinction is important, because it serves notice that the
purposes and policies underlying res judicata and collateral estoppel are
not necessarily the same.2 7 Only res judicata is truly based on considerations
of finality; 28 collateral estoppel began as a relative of equitable estoppel - it was
one party's conduct or position in earlier litigation that made it unfair to later
claim the contrary. Collateral estoppel requires a final judgment, but its
purpose is to assure that the process of issue resolution has concluded.2 9 While
both doctrines withdraw decided matters from further judicial consideration,
they do this in different ways. Res judicata forecloses reconsideration of any
claim or cause of action, no matter how presented; whereas collateral estoppel
only blocks reconsideration of specific arguments actually made by the parties
in an earlier action.
Classical Collateral Estoppel in America:
Cromwell v. County of Sac
These historical distinctions were articulated in the leading nineteenth
century American decision, Cromwell v. County of Sac.30 Cromwell sued to
recover on four bonds and four interest coupons allegedly issued by the County
prosecution of the second. But where the second suit is not merely a repetition of
the former controversy, yet is so related that to allow a given allegation therein would
be to permit a contradiction of some allegation, admission or finding in the first
suit, it is not the judgment itself in the first suit but the particular record item which
would be thus contradicted that stands as the barrier: this and this only is the case
of estoppel by record.
Id. at 46.
26. Id. at 53-54. See, e.g., Eastmure v. Laws, 132 Eng. Rep. 1170, 1173, 5 Bing. (N.C.) 444
(K.B. 1839); Outram v. Morewood, 102 Eng. Rep. 630, 633, 638, 3 East 346, 353, 366 (K.B.
1803); Trevivan v. Lawrence, 91 Eng. Rep. 241, 242, 1 Salkeld 276 (K.B. 1704).
27. The distinct role of the finality interest for each doctrine has been lost or obscured
by terminology. Collateral estoppel has been called "estoppel by judgment," e.g., Robertson
v. Robertson, 61 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1952), and "collateral estoppel by judgment," e.g., Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 91 (1954). Even the modem
terms, "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" join the two ideas as if they are aspects of
a single idea based on the need for final judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8,
introduction, at 1. Professor Vestal originally suggested this terminology, Vestal, Rationale of
Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 29 n.3 (1964), and - ironically - believes its use in the Restatement (Second) "will help to clarify thinking about the impact of decisions." Vestal, The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CoRN=. L. Rv. 464 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Dissent].
28. Res judicata alone both depends upon and is a statement of the effect of a final
judgment resolving the parties' dispute. It gives meaning to a judgment. See generally F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, §§ 11.2-..
29. A final judgment is thus a condition to application of the doctrine, but not the
central idea behind it. The issues determined must be "essential to the judgment," RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27, but this element is used simply to restrict collateral estoppel to those central issues truly determined in the first proceeding. Id. § 27 & comment h.
30. 94 U.S. 351 (1877).
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of Sac. The county defended on the basis of an earlier action, Smith v. Sac
County, 31 which denied recovery to Smith in an action to collect on twenty-five
earlier maturing coupons of the same bonds. Contending Cromwell was the
real and beneficial owner of the coupons at issue in Smith, the county argued
2
that the earlier judgment estopped Cromwell from pursuing his later action3
After reviewing the leading English and American authorities on collateral
estoppel and res judicata,3 3 the Court set forth its now-famous explanation of
the two doctrines. When the same claim is involved in two separate actions
between the same parties, a judgment on the merits against the plaintiff
in the first absolutely bars prosecution of the second. This is true as to every
matter which was offered or which might have been offered to sustain or
defeat the claim. 34 When the second action is on a different claim, however,
the prior judgment will estop only those "matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." 35
Because each bond and coupon represented a separate claim, Smith was
a complete bar only as to further litigation regarding the twenty-five coupons
in that case. 36 The four bonds and four coupons in Cromwell were not among
those twenty-five coupons, so true res judicata was inapplicable. Both Smith
and Cromwell, however, involved the same question of the bonds' legality.
The Court accordingly applied collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation
s
of this issue in Cromwell.
31. 78 U.S. 139 (1870).
32. 94 U.S. at 352. In the earlier case Smith had alleged that the bonds and coupons were
properly issued by Sac County following a special election to provide for erection of a
courthouse; that he was the owner and holder of the 25 interest coupons; and that he received them before maturity and paid value for them; and therefore that they were valid
claims against the county. 78 U.S. at 146. The county's answer specifically denied the allegations
regarding valid authorization and issuance of the bonds and generally denied every other
allegation. Id. at 141, 146. The matter was tried to the court which issued findings of
fact and ruled as a matter of law "that the said bonds and coupons were wholly void as
against the said County of Sac and that the defendant was entitled to judgment." Id. at
143 (emphasis in original).
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the answer, although technically deficient, put
every material allegation of the petition in issue, including whether Smith became a holder
of the coupons before maturity and whether he paid value for them. Id. at 146. The Court
held further that the evidence supported a finding that the bonds were fraudulently issued,
placing the burden on Smith to show he paid value for the coupons before maturity. Id.
at 147-48. Although the question of whether Smith paid value had been put in issue by the
pleadings, there was no indication that he offered any evidence that he paid value nor any
such finding by the Court. The Court concluded he had not shown he was a holder for
value; therefore, the coupons were void as against the county and judgment for defendant
was affirmed. Id. at 148-49.
33. 94 U.S. at 353-58.
34. Id. at 352.
35. Id. at 353.
36. It would not matter that Cromwell, who was in privity with Smith, was now prepared to show he paid value before maturity for those 25 coupons, even if that issue had
actually been litigated in Smith. The Court makes this clear by using as an example another
form of negotiable instrument, the promissory note. Id. at 352-53.
37. Id. at 359. The Cromwell Court determined that the judgment in Smith rested on
two findings: (1) the bonds were void against the county unless acquired for value before
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Owing to the clarity and force of its language, Cromwell became the
standard American statement of collateral estoppel as distinct from res judicata. 3s The opinion is still important today because it emphasizes the need
for actual litigation of issues when the second action is on a different claim P
In addition, Cromwell recognized that each lawsuit is unique, with its own
elements and emphasis. Considerations which govern a party's behavior in

the first action may not exist in the second, such as the value of property in
controversy, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence, and the expense
of litigation. 40
The Expansion of CollateralEstoppel After

Cromwell v. County of Sac
Cromwell taught that courts should be cautious in transferring findings
from one context to another, even when the differences are mostly technical
and fairness considerations point toward preclusion. The leading twentieth
century collateral estoppel opinion, Bernhard v. Bank of America,41 made

Cromwell's cautionary note more important. When Bernhard removed the
mutuality restriction from the doctrine, the opportunities for invoking collateral estoppel greatly expanded.42 Technically, Bernhard enabled courts
maturity; and (2) Smith's failure to prove he gave such value prevented his recovery upon
the coupons. Id. The Court's language is ambiguous as to whether this latter finding was
a "matter in issue or point controverted" to the extent necessary to accord it collateral estoppel effect. The implication is that it was sufficiently litigated. This confusion foreshadows
the current controversy over the extent to which issues raised in pleadings but on which
no evidence is introduced are "actually litigated." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8,
§ 27 comments d & e and reporter's note at 266-69. Compare Dissent, supra note 27, at 470-95
with Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related
Problems, 66 Cop.N.L L. REv. 564, 574-86 (1981). At the time, Cromwell's position probably
made more sense than it would today when pleading theory is dominated by the federal rules'
system of notice pleading. But see Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347
U.S. 89 (1954) (issues raised only in pleadings and no proof offered given collateral estoppel

effect).
Because the four bonds and four coupons at issue in Cromwell were not before the
Smith Court, the issue of the manner of their acquisition had never been litigated. Cromwell
therefore remanded the case for a new trial in which Cromwell could try to prove he was a
bona fide holder for value before maturity. 94 U.S. at 359-60. A much more interesting problem would have been before the Court if Smith had established that all the bonds and
coupons issued were acquired in the same transaction and Cromwell did not offer to show
he acquired his four bonds and coupons separately. Then the question of whether issues
in controversy only at the pleading stage will be considered "actually litigated" would have
been squarely presented and decided in Cromwell. As it is, that question remains open.
38. E.g., F. JAms & G. HAzAW, supra note 8, § 11.3; lB J. MooRE & T. CuRER, supra
note 8, 0.441[1]; RSTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 8, § 27 reporter's note.
39. 94 U.S. at 353, 354, 356, 359-60.
40. Id. at 356. This emphasis is somewhat surprising in Cromwell itself since in the
earlier action Smith was suing for approximately $2,500; in the second suit $4,400 was
involved. There was no indication in the Smith record that any of the cited impediments
were present there. It does appear, however, that Smith never presented (and may not have
even realized the need for) evidence on his status as purchaser for value before maturity.
41. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
42. Prior to Bernhard, most cases invoking collateral estoppel were analytically identical
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to invoke collateral estoppel in situations where previously the mutuality rule
alone had prevented its use. But Bernhard's actual influence was much greater
than this. Justice Traynor's reformulation of collateral estoppel required affirmative answers to three questions: "Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was there
a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?" '4 3 Traynor's
formula strongly emphasizes the "prior adjudication," but does not assure
equal attention to the appropriateness of using the prior adjudication in a
second proceeding. In Bernhard, the prior adjudication was a civil case in
California probate court. But court cases are only part of the adjudicative
process. In ever increasing numbers, administrative agencies are conducting
adjudicative proceedings.4- When courts began to look beyond prior judgments
to Cromwell. See, e.g., United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924); Southern Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
43. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. Bernhard continues to evoke commentary because, although it dealt in a straightforward way with the legal doctrine and announced
the end of the mutuality rule, its facts and their interpretation are not so clear. The central controversy at issue in Bernhard was whether the interbank transfer of funds from Clara
Sather's Los Angeles bank to another account in San Dimas where it was withdrawn by
Charles Cook was a gift. After Mrs. Sather's death Cook became executor of the estate. When
he resigned, his accounting to the probate court did not mention the transferred funds. Helen
Bernhard and the beneficiaries under the will objected to the accounting, and, after a hearing, the probate court overruled the objections finding the funds were a gift from Mrs. Sather
to Cook during her lifetime. Bernhard became administratrix of the estate and sued the
San Dimas bank, then Bank of America, to recover the funds on the ground Mrs. Sather
never authorized their withdrawal.
With mutuality out of the way, the court quickly disposed of the requirements of the
first judgment's finality and identity of issues ("ownership of the money") although neither
conclusion is self-evident. The need for identity of parties against whom collateral estoppel
is invoked was more troublesome. Justice Traynor was forced to resort to an analysis based
on the real party in interest rule. See FED. R. Crv. P. 17; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 367, 369
(West 1982). In the probate proceeding, the beneficiaries of Sather's estate sought recovery
on behalf of the estate against its nominal representative, Cook. In Bernhard, the nominal
representative, Bernhard, sought recovery on behalf of the estate against the Bank of
America. Hence the real parties in interest, against whom collateral estoppel was invoked,
were the same - the beneficiaries of the estate.
Several commentators have suggested the result in Bernhard could have been justified
on the basis of the narrower derivative liability exception to mutuality. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 11, § 96 (indemnitor-indemnitee exception to mutuality in tort actions)). E.g.,
lB J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra note 8, 10.412[3]; Currie, supra note 1, at 290 n.22. Technically this may not be correct, but the reason for the indemnitor-indemnitee exception is
nevertheless applicable. See Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel,
45 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1969). These exceptions promote finality by avoiding placing conflicting
obligations on an individual. To avoid these conflicting obligations, courts created exceptions to the mutuality rule antedating Bernhard. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE & T. CURIaR,
supra note 8, 1 0.412[3] and cases cited therein.
44. In fiscal year 1978, federal administartive law judges conducted more than 200,000
administrative adjudications, as compared to 163,200 federal district court civil and criminal
cases terminated that year for all reasons. E.GELLHORN & B. BOYER, ADMINITIRATE LAW AND
PROCEss IN A NUTSHELL

182 (2d ed. 1981). Federal agency adjudications are governed by the

trial-like procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980). This includes the right to notice of the proceedings and the issues involved, the
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to determinations by administrative agencies acting "in a judicial capacity," 45
the stage was set for a dramatic expansion in the use of collateral estoppel.
Giving administrative decisions preclusive effect in later judicial proceedings is a surprising idea. At the time of Bernhard, most courts viewed administrative hearings as specialized proceedings lacking the disinterested
decision-making machinery and formality of judicial action. Moreover, agency
determinations were not even considered adjudications, and courts held
res judicata and collateral estoppel inapplicable to agency determinations. 6
Gradually certain agencies' findings became accepted as final, both to give
greater authority to agency decisions 47 and to allow courts to review those
decisions without de novo fact-finding.48
right to counsel, to an unbiased hearing officer, the right to present evidence and legal
arguments, to cross-examine opposing witnesses, and an adequate record and findings. See
generally B. ScmvARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAv §§ 94-142 (1976). The Restatement (Second)
also accords collateral estoppel effect to arbitrators' awards involving "adjudicative determinations." RESTATEmENT (SFcoNa), supra note 8, at § 84.
45. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 884 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).

46. The principal Supreme Court case taking this position was Pearson v. Williams,
202 US. 281 (1906). Pearson involved the issue of whether an alien was properly admitted to
the United States. An initial administrative determination in favor of the alien was redetermined unfavorably to him in a later deportation hearing. Characterizing the first determining board as an instrument of the executive department and noting the summary nature
of its procedures, the Court denied res judicata "in a technical sense" to the administrative
decision. Id. at 284-85. This characterization of administrative determinations persisted, at
least in the immigration area, into the 1950s. See Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811, 826
(9th Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). For a critical discussion of both
cases, see 2 K. DAvis, ADrxwsTRATivE LAw TREATISE § 18.02 (1958). See also Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855) (suggesting that
certain matters of "private right," the liability of one individual to another, must be determined in article III courts).
47. With the establishment of executive government centralized in Washington, D.C.,
especially under the New Deal, agencies assumed greater importance and authority, and their
promoters and defenders sought parity with the court system for certain purposes. Legal commentary generally has supported according res judicata and collateral estoppel to at least
some administrative determinations. See, e.g., 2 K. DAvis, supra note 46, § 18.02; Groner &
Sternstein, Res Judicata in FederalAdministrative Law, 39 IowA L. REv. 300 (1954); Schopfiocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942 WIs. L. REv. 5.
48. E.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). Crowell refused to give fall res judicata
effect to factual findings made by commissioners of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission in deciding workers' compensation claims under the Longshoremen's &
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 US.C.
§§ 901-950 [as amended]). Instead, the Court divided these factual findings into two categories: "jurisdictional" factual determinations, those necessary to the conclusion that the
claim came under the statutory scheme; and determinations made in the resolution of a
properly entertained claim, such as the amount of compensation due the employee based on
weekly wage rates. 285 U.S. at 54-57. Only the latter category was accorded full conclusive
effect. The Court construed the Act to permit de novo review of jurisdictional factual determinations. This was to avoid holding that Congress unconstitutionally infringed the
federal courts' article III authority in making the commissioners' factual finding fully
conclusive. Id. at 55-63. This de novo factual review was limited, but not abolished in St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
The doctrine of special review for constitutional facts (also known as the Ben Avon
doctrine after Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) where it was
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The first case to clearly accord an administrative agency determination
preclusive effect in a later judicial action was Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins. 49 Sunshine had previously argued before the National Bituminous
Coal Commission that it should be exempt from a special sales tax because
the coal it produced was not "bituminous." 50 After an evidentiary
hearing,
51
the Commission found Sunshine's coal was "bituminous."'
While Sunshine's exemption claim was pending, the Collector of Internal
Revenue attempted to collect the special tax. Sunshine sued in federal court
to enjoin the tax collection on grounds that the Bituminous Coal Act was unconstitutional and that Sunshine was not subject to its provisions (Sunshine
II). Upholding the Act, the district court held that Sunshine was estopped
from relitigating the status of its coal because this issue was identical to that
52
of the Coal Commission's proceeding. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.
Although issue preclusion. was involved, this case rested more on res judicata principles of finality than collateral estoppel. Because the administrative
decision itself determined the status of Sunshine's coal, relitigation of this
question in Sunshine II would have reopened a final administrative judgment,
not merely an issue of the earlier proceeding. Failure to apply collateral estoppel would have seriously undermined the "finality" of an earlier adjudication,
53
and its use here is entirely proper.
While Sunshine made good sense from a policy standpoint, the Court's
failure to distinguish the true res judicata interest from other applications of
collateral estoppel eventually spawned an over-reliance on administrative
determinations in later judicial proceedings.5 4 Full acceptance for applying
first announced) and jurisdictional facts has neither been followed nor repudiated by the
Supreme Court in recent years. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, §§ 222-29.
Currently, review of agency fact-findings is restricted to a determination of whether the
finding is supported by "substantial evidence" in the administrative record as a whole. 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, § 210. However, this change does not
require that agency factual determinations be given collateral estoppel effect in unrelated
civil court actions any more than the "clearly erroneous" standard for setting aside federal
court fact finding requires they be given collateral estoppel effect in other civil actions. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
49. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
50. The case came before the Court with a lengthy history. In 1937, Congress, as part
of President Roosevelt's "New Deal," enacted The Bituminous Coal Act, Act of April 26,
1937, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72 (repealed 1966). The Act established the National Bituminous Coal
Commission and gave it the power to fix maximum and minimum prices for an organization
of bituminous coal producers. Producers who did not join the organization were subject
to a special sales tax. 310 U.S. at 387-90.
51. This order was upheld by the court of appeals. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 105 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 US. 604
(1939) [Sunshine I].
52. The Supreme Court rejected all of Sunshine's statutory and constitutional challenges
to the Act. 310 U.S. at 391-401.
53. Moreover, Sunshine was perfectly aware of the consequences of the first decision; both
proceedings were pending simultaneously and they were in reality two pieces of one single
dispute.
54. This is somewhat surprising because two other Supreme Court decisions from this
period dealing with administrative determinations both placed limitations on collateral estoppel that are still respected. In United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927),

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 2
RETHINKING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

collateral estoppel to administrative findings dates from the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.5 5 Utah Construction, a private contractor, took its contract disputes with the Atomic Energy Commission to the contract appeals board as designated in the government contract. The appeals board made factual findings and granted Utah
Construction partial relief.5 6
Dissatisfied, Utah Construction sued the government for breach of contract. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the board's findings as conclusive
in the later civil suit based on the contract's disputes clause and "general
principles of collateral estoppel." 57 Commentators have since pointed out that
the Court refused to give collateral estoppel effect to a judgment of the Court of Customs
Appeals classifying wool imports for tariff purposes. The same importer and customs classification issue were involved in both cases. However, the Court held that "res judicata"
principles in customs matters should be limited to controversies involving "the identical
importation." Id. at 235. The Court recognized the danger that might result if a particular
customs determination as to an importer was applied through collateral estoppel to all similar
merchandise of that importer. Serious commercial inequities would then result if different
decisions were made as to other importers of the same type of merchandise. Id. at 236.
In Commissioner v. Sunnen, 833 U.S. 591 (1948), the Court recognized the dangers of
perpetuating tax inequalities, and refused to give preclusive effect to a Board of Tax
Appeals' decision that royalty payments assigned by a taxpayer to his wife were not taxable
to him. The Court sketched out a series of rules for res judicata principles in federal income tax proceedings based on the idea that "[e]ach [tax] year is the origin of a new
liability and of a separate cause of action." Res judicata precludes relitigating a claim of
tax liability or nonliability in a second proceeding involving that claim for that tax year.
Id. at 598.
If a different claim is involved or the identical claim in a different tax year, only collateral
estoppel limits relitigation of issues actually presented and determined in the first suit. Even
collateral estoppel will not preclude relitigation where there has been a change in the legal
atmosphere and a new determination is necessary to avoid inequities among taxpayers. Id. at
598-602.
Because Stone & Downer and Sunnen both involved administrative determinations made
in the course of governmental enforcement of revenue laws, discrimination and inequality
of treatment were greater dangers than those resulting from repetitious litigation. To some
extent these dangers or variations on them are always present in agency adjudication and
arbitration.
55. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
56. Id. at 396-401. The standard government contract allowed the contracting officer to
adjust the contract price or the time for performance if the government ordered changes
in the work, or if the contractor encountered conditions materially different from those
anticipated. Disputes "concerning questions of fact arising under [the] contract" were to
be decided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal to the head of the department or his designate, "whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties ......
Id. at 896-98, 899. Utah Construction filed two claims with the contracting officer seeking additional compensation and an extension of time under the contract. Utah Construction appealed the contracting officer's decisions to the designated Advisory Board of Contract Appeals. The Advisory Board made factual findings and granted Utah Construction an extension of time due to one of the claims. Id. at 400-01.
57. Id. at 400-01, 418-19. The suit was filed in the Court of Claims. The Court of
Claims held that since Utah Construction alleged that the government's unreasonable delays breached the contract, it was not bound by the Board's determinations under the
disputes clause. It reviewed the dispute de novo and found the government responsible for
delays under both claims. In reversing, the Supreme Court's reliance on the disputes clause
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the Court's reliance on collateral estoppel is at best an alternative holding and
may simply be dicta, but this has not restrained the lower federal courts. Instead, courts have found that precluding relitigation of administrative determinations is a useful tool in reducing their caseload burden. 8
The new Restatement Second also endorses applying res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to administrative determinations. Section 83 (1) provides:
Except [where it would be incompatible with a legislative policy], a
valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the
same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.59
THE MODERN LAw OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
These dual developments - relaxed formal requirements for invoking collateral estoppel and the acceptance of administrative determinations as judgments - came together in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore.0° Parklane allowed a
seems well grounded and entirely correct. It simply carried out the intent of the parties.
Reliance on the "general principles of collateral estoppel" has proved more controversial.
Initially, the Court stated alternate grounds as the basis for its holding. Later, however,
the Court appeared to downgrade the collateral estoppel ground as one giving support only
by analogy:
Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of the parties as modified by
the Wunderlich Act, we note that the result we reach is harmonious with general principles of collateral estoppel. Occasionally courts have used language to the effect
that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such
language is certainly too broad. When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial
capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have
had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply
res judicata to enforce repose.
Id. at 421-22 (footnotes omitted).
58. See, e.g., Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative Agency Actions in
Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO.L. REv. 65, 70-71 & n.57 (1977) (cases and commentary cited
therein). Most federal circuits have accepted Utah Construction's invitation to accord administrative determinations collateral estoppel effect. See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific
Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel to
a finding of the Federal Maritime Commission), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Assoc., Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1979) (unfair labor practice damage action); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir.) (collateral
estoppel directed between two administrative proceedings), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 9,12(1970).
But see Paramount Transp. Sys. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 436 F.2d 1064, 1066
(9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (adding the requirement that administrative findings be "supported by substantial evidence on the administrative record as a whole").
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83(1).
60. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Parklane has already developed an extensive commentary of
its own. See Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral
Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINC.s L.J. 755 (1980); Flanagan, Offensive Collateral Estoppel: Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, 1982 AREz. ST. L.J. 45; George,
Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. Rv.
655 (1980); Kempkes, Issue Preclusion: Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Revisited, 31 DEAxE

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 2
RETHINKING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

summary proceeding to displace a judicial resolution of issues, and granted trial
courts virtually unreviewable discretion to do likewise. Corporate management in Parklane allegedly violated federal securities laws by issuing a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger. 61
Two different actions were brought against the defendants: a stockholders'
class action seeking damages, rescission of the merger, and costs; and a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) action for injunctive relief. The stockholders' action was filed first, but the injunctive action resulting in judgment
against the defendants was decided first.6 2 The stockholders sought to use
the issues decided in the SEC ruling against Parklane in their suit. Because the
stockholders were neither parties nor privies to the injunctive action, the
Court was faced with deciding the propriety of offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel.63 The Court found for the stockholder-plaintiffs, holding
defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved
against them in the SEC action.6
In focusing simply on the mutuality problem, the Court overlooked the
fundamental propriety of applying collateral estoppel at all under the circumstances.6 5 Before any issue in earlier litigation can be the basis for collateral estoppel, a court must determine that an issue of fact or law was'
actually litigated, determined, and essential to a valid and final judgment.66
At first glance, Parklane seems to present no problem. The SEC action was
L. RFv. 111 (1981-1982); Statman, The Defensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Multidistrict
Litigation After Parklane, 83 DicK. L. REv. 469 (1979); Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the
Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 1002 (1979).

61. 439 U.S. at 324.

62. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
63. In simple terms, when collateral estoppel is invoked to resist recovery by the plaintiff in the second action it is being used "defensively." When it is invoked in order to
establish the liability of the defendant in the second action, it is being used "offensively."
RMsTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 8, § 29 comment d. When the party relying on collateral
estoppel was not a party to the first action, the use of collateral estoppel is nonmutual. See
supra notes 11 &14 and accompanying text.
64. 439 U.S. at 332-33. The Court held that although applying collateral estoppel prevented defendants from obtaining a jury trial on the question of whether the proxy statements were materially false and misleading, their seventh amendment rights were not violated. Id.at 337.
65. Ironically, Parklane may have regarded the earlier injunctive proceedings as something of a victory. The district court in the SEC action found that Parklane's proxy statement
was false in one respect and incomplete in others, and that each deficiency was material.
422 F. Supp. at 481-86. However, of the five items of relief sought by the SEC, only two
were granted, each involving corporate filings with the SEC. Id. at 480, 486-87. The major
relief requested was an injunction against further violations of the federal securities laws
and appointment of a special counsel to determine the fair market value of Parklane's shares
for the sake of its public shareholders. This relief was denied, based partly on the pendency
of private actions (including Shore) seeking relief on behalf of the public shareholders.
That this partial vindication was turned by the Supreme Court into the vehicle for granting the public shareholders a courtroom victory without the need to prove liability is a
sign of the distortions that can result when collateral estoppel is applied in administrative
cases.
66.

RESATEmET (StcoND), supra

note 8, § 27.
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final, and the district court found Parklane's proxy material deficient in several respects.67 However, because the court found these SEC violations unlikely
to recur,6" it denied injunctive relief and simply directed Parklane to correct its prior misfilings with the SEC.69 Therefore, in considering the propriety of collateral estoppel in Parklane, it is the correction of SEC filings
that constitutes the judgment in the earlier action. The crucial question, ignored by the Parklane court, is whether issues essential to that prior judgment
should bind Parklane in the subsequent stockholder class action for damages.
Not only was the prior judgment of limited severity, but it also resulted
from proceedings which resembled an administrative adjudication as much as a
civil damage action.70 As a regulatory agency charged with protecting the
public interest, the SEC is often given legal and evidentiary benefits in court
similar to those of an administrative proceeding. 71 The SEC has frequently used
affidavits of its investigators or enforcement attorneys as evidence for injunctive
relief.2 In addition, the SEC often seeks expedited hearings based on information obtained through its earlier ex parte investigation and obtains consent
3
orders before a substantial evidentiary hearing is held.

67. 422 F. Supp. at 481-86. Since the proceeding was an injunctive action, there was no
final judgment in traditional form, and the district court's published decision is entitled
"Opinion and Order." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 54(a), 58. The injunctive order was final for purposes of appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1976). An appeal was taken and the district court order
affirmed. 558 F.2d at 1085.
68. 422 F. Supp. at 487. This finding was affirmed on appeal. 558 F.2d at 1089-90. To
grant an injunction, the court must find both past violations of the securities laws and
the reasonable likelihood that any wrong will be repeated. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp.
284, 297 (D.D.C. 1973).
69. 422 F. Supp. at 487. Thus, to the extent that the court denied injunctive relief,
the findings of security law violations are not entitled to collateral estoppel effect for

they were not "essential to the judgment." See

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND),

supra note 8, § 27

comment h, illustrations 13 & 14.
70. At least one student commentator has recognized that Parklane gives all administrative agencies with enforcement powers a new weapon "to force culpable and nonculpable defendants to capitulate." The author argues that the potential preclusive effects
of an agency judgment against defendants charged with securities law violations will force
them to enter into consent decrees, regardless of the merits of their position. Note, supra
note 60, at 1015. Traditionally consent decrees have not been given collateral estoppel effect.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 comment e and reporter's note. But see Note,
supra note 60, at 1017 n.60 and authorities cited therein.
71. See, e.g., SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. E.g., SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (D.D.C. 1975). This
practice was criticized in SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); and SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490-93 (2d Cir.
1968).
73. These practices are detailed in Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 REv. SEC.
REG. Nos. 4 & 6 (1972), reprinted in 1 A. MATHEWS, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws 469, 471-76 (1977). The SEC response is Pitt & Markham, SEC Injunctive Actions, 6 REV. SEC. RaG. No. 5 (1973),

reprinted in

I A. MATHEWS, supra, at 487,

491-92. Although the practices are now curtailed, where the SEC's affidavits' factual allegations are not challenged, the district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
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The Supreme Court in Parklane disregarded the opportunity to consider
whether issues determined in these summary kinds of proceedings should freely
be given collateral estoppel effect in later civil damage actions. Instead, the
Court approached the collateral estoppel issue in a purely mechanistic manner.
Its starting point was Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,74 a patent infringement case, which involved the defensive
use of nonmutual collateral estoppel. The plaintiff sought to relitigate an
essential issue, the validity of its patent, by simply switching adversaries. Upholding the principle of finality in a res judicata sense, Blonder-Tongue discarded mutuality as a condition of collateral estoppel application. 75 The Parklane Court thus perceived the central issue to be whether the mutuality limitation should likewise be abandoned regarding the offensive use of collateral
estoppel.7 6 While acknowledging some troubling aspects of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, 77 the Court concluded that it should be permitted, and
granted the trial courts broad discretion to determine when the doctrine may
be fairly applied.78 This ruling leaves trial courts with little explicit guidance
and provides leeway sufficient to preclude meaningful appellate review. As for
Parklane itself, the Court concluded collateral estoppel was appropriately ap-

74. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
75. In patent litigation, the benefits of the Blonder-Tongue rule are apparent. Preventing repeated litigation of patent validity is both fair to the patent holder and results
in substantial economies of judicial and litigant resources. Id. at 328-30, 334-49. Although
the Blonder-Tongue decision was confined to the issue of patent validity litigation, its sweeping language invited further attempts to apply collateral estoppel unrestrained by the
mutuality rule. See id. at 328.
76. The Parklane Court acknowledged that Blonder-Tongue's rejection of mutuality was
made in the special context of patent litigation, but used that decision's broad language as
a bridge and moved immediately to the question of allowing collateral estoppel to be used
offensively without the mutuality limitation. Id. at 327-29.
77. First, the Court noted that offensive use of collateral estoppel does not do much
for judicial economy. In a multiple-plaintiff situation, it creates incentives for potential
plaintiffs to wait and see how other plaintiffs do. If they win, collateral estoppel will be
available against the defending parties. If they lose, the potential plaintiffs will not be bound
and can try their own luck against the defending parties. Thus joinder by all plaintiffs in
the first action is discouraged, and the total amount of litigation is increased. Id. at 329-30.
Second, collateral estoppel might be unfairly applied to a defendant when little was at
stake in the first action; when the defendant lost one action after previously winning cases
involving the same issue; or when the second action provides procedural advantages not
available in the first that might cause a different result. Id. at 330-31. See REsTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 8, § 29(2).
78. 439 U.S. at 331. "The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the application of offensive collateral
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive
collateral estoppel." Id. As the Court notes, this approach is similar to that of the Restatement (Second) which allows nonmutual collateral estoppel, and does not distinguish between defensive and offensive. Instead, the Restatement (Second) lists eight "circumstances
to which considerations [sic] should be given" that show the party against whom the earlier
finding is to be used "lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action
or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue." REsrATE.
MENT (SEcoND), supra note 8, § 29 & comment d.
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plied to the SEC action 9 since petitioners there had received a "full and
fair" opportunity to litigate the proxy statement issues.80
Parklane is typical of the judicial approach to collateral estoppel issues in
general and the doctrine's application to administrative determinations in
particular: (1) no consideration is given to the foundational issue of whether
invoking collateral estoppel is appropriate in light of the purposes it serves;,"
(2) no consideration is given to the countervailing policy that the parties are
entitled to have this dispute resolved on its merits; and (3) the controlling requirement, the full and fair opportunity to litigate, is used against the party
resisting collateral estoppel and becomes the basis for invoking it.2
79. 439 U.S. at 332.
80. The Court pointed out defendants had a four-day trial with full opportunity to
present evidence and call witneses with the clear awareness that other civil actions were
underway. The mere length of procedings, however, is a poor way to judge whether a party
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Cf. 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 46, § 14.2 (2d ed. 1980).
Nevertheless, the Court is probably on firm ground here. An evidentiary hearing was held
in the SEC action, and the defendants knew that Shore and other cases had already been
filed. However, whether they knew collateral estoppel could prevent them from relitigating
the adequacy of the proxy solicitation is open to question. See Note, supra note 60, at 1007-08
n.25. See also Shapiro & Coquilletie, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on
Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REv. 442 (1971).
Parklane additionally held that the existence or nonexistence of a jury (relegated to
a footnote) was a "neutral" factor not affecting the outcome. 439 U.S. at 332 n.18. Nevertheless, a major part of the Court's opinion discusses defendants' claim that the application
of collateral estoppel denied them a jury trial on the proxy disclosure issues in violation
of the seventh amendment. Id. at 333-37. Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority on both
counts. Id. at 337-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. The Supreme Court notes two purposes collateral estoppel serves: protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy,
and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. 439 U.S. at 326. The first
of these is inapplicable here because Parklane is the only party that will relitigate any
issues and it is seeking to do just that. The second purpose, as the Court candidly notes, is
poorly served by allowing offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel. Since a plaintiff seeking
to take offensive advantage of nonmutual collateral estoppel against a defendant cannot
be bound by the first judgment if defendant wins, its application "will likely increase rather
than decrease the total amount of litigation." Id. at 329-30.
Neither are the other purposes identified with collateral estoppel served here. There
is no finality benefit. The first action is finished, and its result would not be affected regardless of Parklane's outcome. The proxy issue was already settled between the SEC and
Parklane, and those parties remained free to order their affairs based on the earlier judgment.
There could, of course, be some inconsistency between the court determination in the
SEC action and the jury's decision in the stockholder action. That inconsistency would
depend on whether the jury's verdict was against the stockholders and based upon a determination that the proxy statements were sufficient. Even if two different results were reached,
it is unlikely it would adversely affect public confidence in the courts if an agency injunctive
action and private damage action reached inconsistent results.
To all this the Supreme Court replied that "none of the considerations that would justify
a refusal to allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel is present in this case." Id. at 332.
This argument conveniently neglects asking whether collateral estoppel should apply in
the first instance.
82. Since Parklane, the Supreme Court has dealt with specialized aspects of collateral
estoppel. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the Court applied collateral
estoppel against the United States based on a Montana Supreme Court case in which the
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These decisions complete a remarkable expansion and elaboration of the
collateral estoppel doctrine in the forty years since Bernhard. Too often, however, courts have applied the doctrine uncritically, allowing administrative
determinations to displace judicial resolution of issues without a serious comparison of the two adjudicative processes. The next section looks critically
at some current applications of collateral estoppel.
THE DOCTINE AS APPLIED IN RECENT CASES:
USE OF ADMINISTRATIvE DETERMINATIONS

Much of collateral estoppel's ready acceptance results from its association
with res judicata's goal of finality. Yet the two doctrines are not necessarily
related. Each application of collateral estoppel serves the need for finality,
fairness and judicial economy in varying degrees. Failure to balance the interests in each instance can produce results "abhorrent to [our] sense of justice
and to orderly law administration." Similar results have already occurred
due to the courts' increasing willingness to give administrative findings collateral estoppel effect in later judicial actions.
Federal and state court decisions applying collateral estoppel to administrative determinations can be divided into three categories. The first category
includes cases like Sunshine, which properly give preclusive effect to an administrative decision to preserve its finality.5s A typical example is United
States v. Jan HardwareManufacturing Co.8 4 Following an inspection by the
United States Department of Labor, Jan Hardware was assessed a monetary
penalty for violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).85 The
company intended to contest the proposed penalties before the Review Commission8 6 but failed to answer the Secretary of Labor's complaint. Subsequently,
the Commission dismissed the company's contest and confirmed the violations
8 7
and penalties.
When Jan Hardware failed to pay the assessed penalty, the United States
sued in district court to collect it.8 The court held Jan Hardware was collaterally estopped from arguing that the United States had failed to prove
the violations and that OSHA was unconstitutional.8 9 The doctrine was appropriately invoked because it protected the finality of the administrative deUnited States controlled the litigation and had a financial interest in the outcome. And in
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Court held that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata are applicable to civil rights claims brought in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
83. This is the best use of collateral estoppel because it directly aids the res judicata
finality interest by preserving the resolution of the dispute achieved in the first proceeding.
See Introduction to RESrATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 8, at 10-11.
84. 463 F. Supp. 732 (ED.N.Y. 1979).
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
86. The Commission is an independent agency with authority to issue decisions respecting OSHA citations and proposed penalties. Id. § 659 (c).
87. 463 F. Supp. at 734.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1976) authorizes such suits to be brought in United States dis-

trict court.
89. 463 F. Supp. at 734-35.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss3/2

18

Perschbacher: Rethinking Colatteral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

cision. The district court suit was simply a collection action, and relitigating
the existence of the violations would have destroyed the value of the administrative proceeding. 9
This first category also includes cases which accord collateral estoppel to
administrative determinations where the finality interest is at stake but where
new parties are involved. 91 For example, when an employer files an unfair
labor practice charge 92 with the National Labor Relations Board against a
union and the Board finds no unfair labor practice, that finding becomes
final. Courts have barred the employer from relitigating the unfair labor practice claim when sued later for damages in federal district court. 93
90. An analogous case involving arbitration is ACMAT Corp. v. International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 442 F. Supp. 772 (D. Conn. 1977). ACMAT was the victim of a jurisdictional strike involving which of three unions should be assigned to assemble a tower crane.
The dispute was submitted to arbitration before the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes
Board which decided the work should be assigned to a composite crew of iron workers
and operating engineers. Id. at 775-79. ACMAT brought suit in federal district court against
the unions based on §§ 301 and 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 US.C.
§§ 185, 187 (1976). The iron workers and operating engineers argued, and the court held,
that the arbitral decision assigning them the disputed work was a finding that they were
entitled to the work and that this established an entitlement defense in the § 303 damage
action against them, 442 F. Supp. at 781-85. Although the application of the arbitral decision was labeled "collateral estoppel," that decision was actually being accorded the finality associated with res judicata. The arbitration award had determined which unions were
entitled to the work, and the district court refused to relitigate the matter.
91. Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), discussed supra notes
31-41, can best be understood as reinforcing finality principles in a nonmutuality context.
Permissive joinder rules enabled plaintiffs to sue a second defendant after having lost a
suit to recover the same claim from a first defendant. Res judicata, strictly interpreted, did
not apply because the second defendant was not bound by the first judgment; that is, the
second action was a separate cause of action. Res judicata principles were nevertheless invoked, clothed in the language of collateral estoppel, to bar the second attempt to recover
on the same claim. See also Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert, denied,
340 U.S. 866 (1950).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) (prohibiting various secondary union activities- e.g.,
secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes).
93. Id. § 187 (§ 303 creates a federal cause of action for damages against labor organizations engaged in unfair labor practices under § 8(b)(4)). E.g., International Wire v. Local 38,
IBEW, 475 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). When the reverse situation is presented and the Board finds an unfair labor practice was committed, the courts
have also applied collateral estoppel offensively in a subsequent § 303 damage action E.g.,
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1979);
Texaco, Inc. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int'l Union, 472 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973); Paramount Transp. Sys. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers, Local 150, 436 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971). Analytically, the two situations are distinguishable. Employers should prefer the unfair labor practice proceeding before the
NLRB since it can result in a quick cessation of the harmful union activity and since it
is prosecuted by the government. Dawson, Why a Decision by the NLRB Under 8(b)(4) Should
Be Determinative on the Issue of Liability in a Subsequent Section 303 Damage Suit, 27
OKLA. L. Rav. 660, 672 (1974). If the employer brings such a proceeding and loses, the
later damage action realistically must be seen as a harassment tactic against the union, a
clear attempt to circumvent the unfavorable NLRB decision in a proceeding the employer
initiated. If the employer wins and the union activity is enjoined, an opposite result in
the later damage action would not destroy the NLRB decision or its effectiveness. Additionally, the union should be allowed to relitigate fully in the damage action if, as in Park-
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The same finality interests also may be at stake in arbitration proceedings.
Ritchie v. Landau9 4 is the most widely cited case for the proposition that arbitration awards can be given collateral estoppel effect in later judicial actions.
In Ritchie, a lawyer employed by a petrochemical corporation claimed entitlement to a substantial bonus for certain recoveries he had obtained for the
corporation. As required by his employment contract, he first sought the bonus
in an arbitration proceeding where he received only ten percent of the amount
allegedly due. He then attempted to collect the remainder from the corporation's principal shareholder. The district court dismissed his suit on collateral
estoppel grounds and the Second Circuit affirmed.95 Technically, res judicata
was inapplicable because the principal share holder was not a formal party
to the arbitration. Nevertheless, res judicata principles of finality were really
at stake because plaintiff tried to obtain in court what he did not get in
arbitration.
Although these cases might have been approached differently, the results
are supported by the true res judicata goal of preserving the finality of judgments. Unfortunately, courts have not adequately understood and distinguished these cases on res judicata grounds. The ensuing confusion foreshadowed the resulting mischief caused by too casually applying collateral estoppel
to administrative determinations.
The second and third categories of collateral estoppel cases involve issue
determinations rather than final judgments. In the second category, collateral
estoppel effect is given a previously determined issue that is simply one aspect
of the parties' current, broader dispute. Cromwell exemplifies this type of collateral estoppel that occurs when the rules defining the scope of a single cause
of action require that aspects of the single dispute be litigated separately.
These situations involve a series of claims separated in time (claims for rent
or retirement payments); or the need for negotiability (a series of promissory
notes or bonds and coupons); or situations where compulsory joinder of related claims is not required (counter-claims and cross-claims in automobile
accident litigation). In these cases, courts rightly hear the common issue once,
rather than wastefully rehearing the same issue in each case.
The need for finality is not as compelling in this second category of collateral estoppel as in the first. Relitigating the common issue would not upset
that aspect of the parties' dispute that was resolved in the earlier action.
Nevertheless, since the several actions are interrelated, once a party has presented an issue and lost, notions of finality, fairness, and judicial economy
lane, it can get a jury trial in the federal court action and a different result would be
possible. Cf. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce
Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952). Consequently, relitigation should be permitted, allowing evidentiary use of the NLRB decision and record. On the other hand, the NLRB proceedings and
§ 303 damage actions are so closely related they could be considered two aspects of a single
claim. Under this view, the NLRB decision should be determinative of the liability issue in
the § 303 action. See also Note, Labor Law -Res Judicata- The Applicability of Res Judicata
and CollateralEstoppel to Actions Brought Under Section 8(bX4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 67 MicH. L. R.v. 824, 834-35 (1969).
94. 475 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 156.
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justify barring his relitigation of that issue in related actions. These justifications for issue preclusion are not as strong, however, when the party seeking
collateral estoppel succeeded on that issue in the earlier action. Various elements in the litigation context may make it unfair to hold that resolution
inviolate between the parties. 96

In the third category collateral estoppel precludes litigation of issues on
the basis of an earlier adjudication not closely related to the current judicial
action. Such cases involve a weak "finality" interest, a variable "fairness" interest, and even a reduced "judicial economy" interest. Most administrative
determinations that are given collateral estoppel effects are examples of this
third type.
Two examples of the danger inherent in such an approach are Bowen v.
United States and the lower court decision in Moore v. Bonner. These cases
do not have a strong basis in res judicata-finality principles. Instead they rest
primarily on notions of judicial economy-questionable support for their severe
preclusive effects.
In Bowen v. United States,97 Bowen undertook to fly his private plane
from Texas to Indiana with an intermediate stop in Arkansas. While landing
in Indiana in poor weather, the plane crashed short of the runway because of
accumulated ice on the aircraft. The aircraft was not equipped with de-icing
equipment and its flight manual prohibited operation in "known icing
conditions."
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) suspended Bowen's pilot's
license for 30 days. Bowen appealed, and in a National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) hearing the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Bowen
had been aware of possible icing conditions. In addition, the ALJ found that
Bowen had violated FAA regulations by operating the aircraft in violation of
its flight limitations and by operating it in a careless manner. Nevertheless the
suspension order was reduced to 15 days.
Later Bowen brought a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the United
States alleging that he crashed because of the negligence of air traffic controllers in not warning him of the icing conditions. The district court judge
held that the NTSB decision precluded Bowen from relitigating his contributory negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Applying Indiana law9 8 but
96. E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965)
(small claim plaintiff's verdict after second trial from which no appeal was taken did not
support use of the judgment as collateral estoppel in second action for larger claim), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Taylor v. Hawkinson, 49 Cal. 2d 893, 306 P.2d 797 (1957) (suspicion that first judgment was the result of a compromise verdict); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161
Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1958) (collateral estoppel denied because monetary
amounts at stake in the first action were small and contributory negligence claim complicated
the second action). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 28. This type of
concern led Professor Currie initially to restrict the abandonment of mutuality to cases
where the party to be foreclosed enjoyed the initiative in the first litigation. See Currie, supra
note 1, at 289-94, 303-07, 322.
97. 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
98. The question of the applicable substantive law under the Federal Tort Claims Act
occupied most of the court's attention. Id. at 1315-19. Its discussion of collateral estoppel
was also found to be governed by Indiana law. Id. at 1319 n.20, 1320. Judicial review was
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relying primarily on Utah Construction, the court noted that "one fair opportunity to litigate an issue is enough." The court stated "that issue preclusion
applies to a final administrative determination of an issue properly before
an agency acting in a judicial capacity when both parties were aware of
the possible significance of the issue in later proceedings and were afforded a
fair opportunity to litigate the issue and obtain judicial review." 99 Finding
these criteria met and nothing militating against the application of administrative collateral estoppel, Bowen's action was summarily dismissed.
A second example of the dangers inherent in this third category of collateral estoppel is Moore v. Bonner.0 0 Moore, a black high school guidance
counselor, intervened in a reading mastery test being given by the school district's reading coordinator. Moore objected because the test was given without
the usual notice to students and their parents. An angry confrontation ensued
between her and the coordinator. 10 '
Pursuant to the school superintendent's recommendation, 0 2 Moore's contract was not renewed. At Moore's request, a formal hearing was held before
the Board of Education. The Board upheld the nonrenewal, finding unprofessional conduct and insubordination. Moore chose not to appeal and instead
filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the state Employment Security
Commission. The claim adjudicator's finding in her favor was affirmed by
the Appeals tribunal. Moore thereafter filed a federal civil rights action
alleging that the failure to renew her contract constituted race discrimination
and a retaliation for the exercise of her first amendment rights. The district
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, giving collateral
estoppel effect to the Board of Education's earlier decision. Simultaneously, the
court denied collateral estoppel effect to the decision regarding unemployment
benefits. 0 3
The federal trial judge concluded that the Board of Education was acting
as an adjudicative body when it upheld Moore's nonrenewal; that its decision
was made in a "trial-like proceeding"; and that "the ultimate fact resolved in
the proceeding before the Board -that the plaintiff's teaching contract was
validly nonrenewed for reasons of her unprofessional conduct and insubordination - prevents relitigation of the issue that the failure to renew was not for
available under 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a). Without judicial review the NTSB determination that
Bowen violated FAA regulations became final.
99. Id. at 1322.
100. 526 F. Supp. 143 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'd 695 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1982) (relying primarily

on limited full faith and credit due an unappealed state administrative decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1976)).

101. Id. at 145.
102. Following the incident, the school superintendent twice asked Moore to provide a
written description of what had happened, explaining that it might affect her employment

for the next year. She responded by requesting a written statement of the source and
the substance of any allegations against her, and an open public hearing before the Board
of Education. The superintendent replied that he was going to recommend to the Board
that Moore not be rehired for the next year, and that if his recommendation were followed
she would be entitled to a formal, hearing. Id. at 145-46.
103. Id. at 145, 151.
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the asserted reasons.' ' 104 The trial court paid little heed to Moore's arguments
that the racial discrimination claims were neither fully presented to nor determined by the Board, 10 5 and that the Board was biased against her.10 6 The
court refused to give similar collateral estoppel effect to the unemployment
benefits decision because it considered that proceeding to involve different
standards of proof. To disqualify Moore before the unemployment benefits
commission, the Board had to show nonrenewal was based upon "willful misconduct"; whereas to foreclose Moore's discrimination claims in district court,
the Board only needed to show "just cause" for nonrenewal.117
Ultimately Moore was reversed on appeal, and indeed, some prominent
appellate court decisions in this third category have denied collateral estoppel
effect to administrative determinations in later judicial proceedings.'0 8 Such
decisions carefully evaluate -whether a particular agency determination should
be given preclusive effect in the particularjudicial proceeding under consideraation. The tendency to use collateral estoppel of administrative determinations
is more pronounced at the overburdened trial court level as Gear and the
Moore district court opinion illustrate. Bowen and Moore are nevertheless
104. Id. at 147, 149-50. The trial judge relied on the acceptance of administrative collateral estoppel found in Utah Construction and its acceptance by the Fourth Circuit in
Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 627, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979). In reversing,
the Fourth Circuit relied on the policies favoring a federal forum for § 1983 actions and
the scope of full faith and credit under § 1738. The court did not discuss the nature of the
Board proceedings. 695 F.2d at 800-02.
105. 526 F. Supp. at 150 & n.9. The court found that "[w]hether or not plaintiff squarely
raised before the Board issues of racially discriminatory motivation and infringement of
free speech and association, she clearly had the right and opportunity under the state
statute to raise those issues or to specifically reserve them," id. (emphasis added), and
that "[t]he Berkeley County Board of Education's determination that the plaintiff was
properly nonrenewed because of unprofessional conduct and insubordination actually and
necessarily disposes of her claim that the decision not to renew was racially motivated or
carried out in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. at 150. This
conclusion is suspect logically because the two allegations are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the court appears to fundamentally confuse res judicata (which it rejects as a basis
for its decision, id. at 149) with collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel requires actual litigation. Only res judicata operates to foreclose issues that might have been presented but
were not. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 8, §§ 24 & 27 & comment e; lB J. MOORE & T. CURRuR, supra note 8,
0.405[3].
106. Moore argued that the Board was evaluating its earlier action not to renew her
contract, and thus would not likely find that action had been improper. To this the court
responded that Moore's contention ignored the "presumption of honesty and integrity" of the
Board's adjudication. 526 F. Supp. at 148.
107. Id. at 150-51.
108. See, e.g., Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1980) (collateral
estoppel effect denied state Human Relations Commission determination in § 1983 civil
rights action because it was impossible to tell what the Commission decided and because
the Commission lacked jurisdiction to award damages); Lightsey v. Harding, Dahm & Co.,
623 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1980) (conclusory nature of hearing before real estate licensing agency
prevented giving its findings collateral estoppel effect in later breach of contract damage
action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(lack of procedural safeguards in the administrative hearing, including no live testimony
or cross-examination, prevented the use of those findings in later Title VII action).
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typical in that the courts' discussion of collateral estoppel in novel situations
combines mechanistic reasoning (has a checklist of factors been satisfied?)
with the extreme flexibility of certain standards (was the party to be estopped
given a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the first proceeding?).
With so much room for discretion, it is not surprising that many courts have
lost sight of the foundational elements of collateral estoppel1 o9
RECONSIDERING THE RATIONALE FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The practice of taking issues from one context to resolve disputes in another context deserves closer consideration. Identical parties are no longer required, and collateral estoppel effect may be given in one proceeding to issues
determined in another type of proceeding; therefore, there is no longer any
necessary relation between the dispute in which the issues were originally
resolved and the one in which they are given preclusive effect.110 As a result,
courts now invoke collateral estoppel when its only real justification is to
save some time.
In General
In a recent decision,"' the Supreme Court restated the policies underlying collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Court noted that both doctrines
serve the civil judicial system's goal of securing the conclusive resolution of
disputes. When a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, precluding further contest protects adversaries from the expense and vexation of further
litigation, conserves judicial resources, and minimizes the likelihood of inconsistent decisions. The doctrines thus increase respect for and reliance on
judicial decisions."12 Each of these purposes deserves closer examination to
109. This tendency of courts to lose sight of the original justifications for applying
collateral estoppel is especially pronounced in several cases where criminal defendants have
urged that elements of their prosecution be precluded by earlier determinations favorable
to them in administrative adjudications. E.g., People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321,
186 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982) (collateral estoppel required dismissal of criminal welfare fraud
charges based on an earlier "fair hearing" determination that defendant was not required to
repay AFDC and food stamp benefits); United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.) (defendants claim that mail fraud charges should be dismissed and collateral estoppel applied
to an earlier Postal Service administrative decision in their favor rejected only because defendants failed to specify the issues actually litigated in the earlier proceeding), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 979 (1979).
110. As recently as 20 years ago, Professor James confidently rejected as "plausible" in
theory but "seldom realized in practice" the following danger: if findings were available
to prove mediate data as well as ultimate facts, the multiplicity of contexts in which a
present finding may become binding in future disputes would be infinitely multiplied. Thus,
it would be impossible to foresee the significance which a present finding might assume.
F. JAMES, CrviL PRocEDu E 582 (1965). Instead, James pointed out, "[i]n the actual cases the
second cause of action has nearly always been a natural and quite predictable outgrowth
of the situation which gave rise to the original claim." Id. Professor James could not have
foreseen the potential distortions resulting when findings of nonjudicial bodies became
available as a source of collateral estoppel in civil and criminal court proceedings.
111. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
112. Id. at 153-54.
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determine when they are served by applying collateral estoppel to administrative rulings.
Conclusive Resolution of Disputes - Finality
The purpose of the judicial system is to resolve disputes and thereby settle
the parties' legal relationships. 113 Res judicata principles further this goal by
making court judgments final.14 When res judicata makes administrative rulings final, it enables agencies to fulfill their primary role of relieving courts
of certain disputes. 115 If these disputes could be fully relitigated in court, agency
proceedings would become a meaningless and wasteful exercise.11 6 To truly
resolve disputes, agency decisions must be deemed final, like the judgments of
courts."

7

Different considerations are at stake for collateral estoppel. Courts and administrative tribunals decide issues only as a means of settling parties' disputes. The issues themselves do not have the independent significance that
113. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168
U.S. 1 (1897), contains an eloquent statement of this goal. He stated:
This general rule [of res judicata and collateral estoppel] is demanded by the very
object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and
repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination.
Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial
tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property
if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments
of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue, and actually determined by them.
Id. at 49 (Harlan, J.). Virtually all commentators agree that the need for finality is the
major policy underlying both collateral estoppel and res judicata. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 8, § 1.1; 1B J. MOORE & T. CuRRIER, supra note 8,
0.405[3], 0.441[2];
Berch, A Proposal to Permit Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking Affirmative Relief,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. fill; Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1036, 1042-43
(1971); Polasky, supra note 8, at 219-22; Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J.
29 (1964).
114. The litigation is concluded with a final judgment, and the underlying claim is
extinguished. More importantly, a final judgment settles the dispute that brought the parties to court in the first place to the extent the legal process can do so. Introduction to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, at 11. A new legal relationship is established among
the parties, or the old one is reaflirmed. Res judicata thus gives the judgment permanence,
and the parties can plan their affairs accordingly. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 597 (1948). See generally Callen & Kadue, supra note 60, at 762-64.
115. This is particularly true of disputes involving injuries in the workplace. See Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 67-72 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116. Generally, relitigation of arbitration awards in court also undermines the arbitration proceedings. Arbitration, however, is contractually based, and the parties may contract
to make the proceedings non-binding. Cf. RESTATEmENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 84(4) &
comment h.
117. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932). Arbitration awards must also be
final to be effective. See Brazill v. Isham, 12 N.Y. 9 (1854). Cf. Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp.
730 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afJ'd, 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966).
See generally Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 MICH. L. REV. 231, 260-62
(1977).
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a final judgment does."18 The purposes that support res judicata thus have a
second-hand operation in collateral estoppel, at best.1 9
The finality justifications for collateral estoppel are strongest when relitigating the issue in the second suit could effectively reopen the administrative adjudication, or expose a party to conflicting obligations from inconsistent
rulings. This is not usually the case when the first adjudication is that of an
administrative tribunal and the second is that of a court. Administrative tribunals are created for specialized purposes and have very limited jurisdiction.
Often, "issues" resolved there have a specialized meaning not freely transferable
20
to the judicial context.
Protection of Litigants From the "Expense
and Vexation" of Multiple Suits
The policy of protecting litigants from multiple suits is a less than compelling justification for collateral estoppel.121 For example, it has no application
to offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel because the only party relitigating
an issue, and therefore potentially vexed, will resist the use of collateral
estoppel. 2 2 The proponent of collateral estoppel in such a case will not have
litigated the issue. Any claim of harassment by a party who has never litigated
the issue is very limited. When defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel is
involved, even the worst instances of unfairness do not involve relitigation by
23
the defending party.
118. J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIvIL PROCEURE 918 n.1 (1981). This is particularly true
for arbitration awards that are not subject to judicial review on the law or facts applied
by the arbitrator in making the award. See, e.g., Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc.,
875 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967); Cothron v. Interinsurance Exchange, 103 Cal. App. 3d 853, 163

Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980).
119. Unless relitigation of an issue would effectively destroy the first administrative
determination, the need to preserve the settlement does not support collateral estoppel's
application. Eliminating mutuality means collateral estoppel will often be invoked between
at least some different parties in the second suit. Thus, relitigation of an issue determined
in the first suit cannot upset the judicial resolution achieved in the first. For example, in
Parklane, relitigation of the adequacy of the proxy material in the stockholders' suit could
not affect Parklane's obligation to amend its filings with the SEC as required by the judgment in the SEC injunctive action. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
120. E.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(determination by the Federal Maritime Commission that "foreign commerce" was not involved under the Shipping Act did not preclude a showing by plaintiffs that foreign commerce was affected to give the court jurisdiction of their Sherman Act claim), cert denied,
393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Kelly v. Trans Globe Travel Bureau, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 195, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1976) (employer can relitigate whether employee was acting within the scope
of employment in civil action brought by third party despite worker's compensation finding that employee was acting within the scope of employment).
121. This policy is nevertheless frequently cited by both courts and commentators.
See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel,
Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. RPv. 1457 (1968); Vestal, supra note 27, at
31, 34.
122. By definition, in any instance of nonmutual collateral estoppel only the estopped
party has litigated the issue before. See, e.g., Parklane, 439 U.S. at 322-23. See also 1B J.
MooRa &T. CuRsRIt, supra note 8, OA12.

123. See, e.g., supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Collateral estoppel supported
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This leaves the more typical case where both parties litigated the issue
before but in connection with another cause of action. Even here, the extent
to which collateral estoppel "saves" one of the parties from vexatious litigation pales on closer analysis. Collateral estoppel does not entirely prevent the
second suit.124 Only one or more issues are foreclosed. Deleting these issues
may not significantly save time or vexation. 125 Party expectation interests
make this rational even less applicable to situations in which the parties'
dispute results in administrative and judicial proceedings. Only judicial proceedings have a long-standing tradition of finality. The parties are unlikely to
rely on the administrative proceeding as a final resolution of their dispute, and
they cannot reasonably claim vexation if additional judicial proceedings follow.
Conservation of Judicial Resources
Judicial Economy

-

A third major justification for precluding reconsideration of decided matters is judicial economy. While the goal of judicial economy is a main justification of res judicata, it has only partial application to collateral estoppel. 126 By
banning relitigation of a claim regardless of new evidence, new theories of
recovery or defense, or arguments that the first suit was wrongly decided, res

by finality goals was invoked to prevent relitigation of the lawyer's claim, but not by a
party to the prior arbitration.
124. Of course it could if the issue(s) that will not be relitigated are essential to one
party's recovery or defense. In such a case, it would be irrational for the party against whom
collateral estoppel will be asserted to attempt to relitigate.
125. See First Nat'l Bank v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St. 395, 199 N.E.2d 863
(1964), in which the Ohio court refused to abandon the mutuality requirement in part because
the savings in litigation time achieved by allowing collateral estoppel in that case would be
slight. Even Professor Hazard, the Restatement (Second) reporter and defender of liberalized use of collateral estoppel, concedes that minimizing inconvenience for opposing parties
is insufficient justification for use of the doctrine. Hazard, supra note 113, at 1041. See also
Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YArE L.J. 339, 346-48 (1948).
Where the first litigation was an adminsitrative or arbitral proceeding, the claim that
having to defend or prosecute a related action in court amounts to vexatious relitigation
can realistically be asserted only by criminal defendants who prevailed in the first proceeding. In this regard the defendants in United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979) and People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1982), may have a point. See supra note 109.
126. This justification has been increasingly invoked. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) ("Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata,
has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical
issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing
needless litigation."); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
328, 348 (1971) ("[C]ourts have often discarded the rule [of mutuality] while commenting
on crowded dockets and long delays preceding trial."); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93
HARv. L. REv. 60, 219 (1979) ("Responding to increasing docket pressure, many courts have
expanded the use of collateral estoppel by relaxing the mutuality requirement."); Semmel,
supra note 121, at 1457 ("Mutuality has always been abandoned in the name of judicial
economy."); Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IowA L. Rtv. 281, 281
(1980) ("[TIhe pressure of overwhelming work loads has given the courts additional incentive to use the preclusion doctrine to foreclose repetitive litigation of claims and issues.").
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judicata enforces finality in the judicial system.127 Collateral estoppel, on the
other hand, has never prevented relitigation in this wholesale way. By definition, a second action on a different claim has already begun. The issues in the
first action must actually have been litigated and determined. Since only the
number of issues, not necessarily the number of cases, is reduced, any time
12
savings is on a smaller scale.
In many situations, no time or expense will be saved through application
of collateral estoppel. If collateral estoppel effects are foreseeable in advance,
the parties will likely litigate the first action with an eye towards related
future actions. Hence, impending application of collateral estoppel encourages the parties to expend more resources litigating the issue in the first
action. 29 In every instance, additional time and expense must be invested
in litigating the new question of whether to apply collateral estoppel in the
second action. This preliminary inquiry can be detailed and complex, particularly when collateral estoppel is invoked by a party who was a stranger to
the first litigation. 30 This inquiry is further compounded when collateral
estoppel effect is claimed for administrative determinations. Much of the efficiency claimed for administrative determinations is lost when the parties
understand any decision will carry collateral estoppel implications."'s
127. See Introduction to RESTATE MNT (SECOND), supra note 8, at 11-12.
128. "The burdens of time and inconvenience involved in a policy which liberally allows
relitigation are miniscule when compared with those burdens now imposed by elaborate
discovery and pre-trial procedures, prolonged trials and multiple appeals." Hazard, supra
note 113, at 1041. However, the time and money savings in avoiding relitigation of a
complex issue can be substantial. See e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-30, 348-49 (1971).
129. See Polasky, supra note 8, at 220-21.
130. See REsTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 8, §§ 27-29, 83 & 84. A related problem,
the difficulty of determining whether the government had a full opportunity to present
its criminal case in an earlier prosecution, was cited by the Court in refusing to apply
collateral estoppel to bar a second related prosecution in Standefer v. United States, 447
U.S. 10, 24 (1980).
131. Similar problems and a similar phenomenon were described by Professor James in
discussing the use of consent judgments as a basis for collateral estoppel. James, supra
note 9, at 188-89. He identified two reasons for denying collateral estoppel effect to consent judgments that appear equally applicable in considering administrative determinations
and arbitration awards. First, in many cases the application of the doctrine may be unforeseeable although the context in which it is applied is foreseeable, and, second, that when
the parties do foresee that the doctrine will be applied, it will lessen the chance of compromise. Id. at 188-89.
The first danger is already apparent. Moore v. Bonner, 526 F. Supp. 143 (D.S.C. 1981),
rev'd, 695 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1982); People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Reptr.
77 (1982), and United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979),
are all arguably cases where future litigation was foreseeable or already underway but where at
least one of the parties (and sometimes the court) was surprised to see a claim of collateral
estoppel made based upon the administrative determination. See supra note 109.
Similarly poorly situated are the recent civil rights litigants in federal court caught between the rock of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) and the hard place of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (Kremer's federal court employment discrimination action was
barred because he sought review of an adverse state administration determination in state
court). But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (federal court action
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Even if a clear savings of judicial time and resources could be demonstrated,
it is questionable whether such savings should justify extending collateral estoppel effect to administrative determinations. 132 The court's resolution of the
parties' dispute loses much of its moral force and acceptability when it is
based on decisions made by someone else. 1 33 Cases decided by employing the
doctrine of collateral estoppel are not really decided at all, but simply rubberstamped. Moreover, collateral estoppel saves the most time when its effects
are least foreseeen. Even the Supreme Court, despite its enthusiasm for lightening the judicial system's litigation burden, is reluctant to rely too heavily
on judicial economy as a justification for collateral estoppel13 4
Minimizing Inconsistent Decisions
Finally, proponents claim that collateral estoppel fosters reliance on judicial action and advances public confidence in the courts by minimizing the
possibility of inconsistent decisions.135 Although inconsistent decisions are
permitted despite earlier adverse ruling by arbitrator under collective bargaining agreement).
As Professor James points out, this potential for unfair surprise may decrease, but it will not
entirely disappear especially where one or both parties are not represented by counsel. This
is often the case in administrative hearings. Cf. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, § 100. Even if a
party's lawyer is unaware of the possibility of collateral estoppel in civil litigation, the client
is likely to look to that lawyer for losses suffered if they are later taken by surprise. The
unrepresented party in an administrative hearing is a self-insurer.
The second possibility is that the parties to an administrative hearing are aware of
the potential for using its findings as collateral estoppel in later judicial actions, and consequently they will litigate the agency hearing as an adversary court trial. This has even been
suggested as a desirable consequence of granting collateral estoppel effect to such determinations. See Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1978). These sentiments
have not persuaded the "father" of administrative law. Professor Davis notes in his Treatise
that: "Excessive Use of Trial Procedure Is a Major Malady of Today's Administrative Process."
3 K. DAvIS, supra note 45, § 14:1 (2d ed. 1980).
132. Recent decisions virtually never mention such countervailing considerations. An
exception is Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980). Standefer was accused, inter alia,
of aiding and abetting a revenue official in accepting improper compensation. Before his
case came to trial, the revenue official was acquitted of three of the charges for accepting
improper compensation. Standefer argued in part that collateral estoppel should be applied
against the government to prevent it from relitigating those charges against him. The Supreme
Court rejected this claim relying in part on the argument that enforcement of the criminal
law and accurate results in criminal proceedings were more important than litigation economy. 447 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting from the court of appeals opinion).
133. Cf. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, § 1.2, at 5. Professor Cleary made the same
point about res judicata over 30 years ago:
The final justification of the usual rule of res judicata, the saving in court time, is
peculiarly unconvincing. Courts exist for the purpose of trying lawsuits. If the courts
are too busy to decide cases fairly and on the merits, something is wrong. Decision
solely in terms of the convenience of the court approaches the theory that the individual exists for the state.
Cleary, supra note 125, at 348.
134. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 (1980); Blonder Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
135. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
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something of an embarrassment, courts seem to be able to live with them
regularly, sometimes on a fairly well-publicized level. 3 6 But collateral estoppel
only preserves consistent resolutions of the same issue, not the same case. This
is an unlikely matter of great public concern. Surely factors leading to inconsistent decisions - more or less sympathetic parties, trial by jury or judge, new
counsel or evidence- can be understood by the public as well as the bench
and bar.33 7 Inconsistent decisions ought to be at least as tolerable as consistent
error, 38 something the judicial system is said to accept through stare decisis.
To the extent that this policy expresses the concern that courts should
avoid imposing conflicting legal obligations on a single individual, 139 it is more
appropriately a part of res judicata than collateral estoppel. The need for a
final decision ordering the parties' legal relations is protected by res judicata
and justifies the first category of collateral estoppel. 4 Likewise, when an administrative ruling would effectively be nullified or its parties subjected to conflicting commands by later relitigation of the decided issues,14' a convincing case
is made for collateral estoppel because the stronger policies supporting res
42
judicata are implicated.
Special Problems of Applying CollateralEstoppel
to Administrative Determinations
The foregoing critique suggests courts' regular reliance on the policies of
finality, prevention of vexatious litigation, judicial economy, and minimization of inconsistent decisions in applying collateral estoppel is often misplaced.
Administrative proceedings have, in addition, peculiar characteristics which
make them especially inappropriate sources for collateral estoppel. Such proceedings typically have informal procedures and the resolution of disputes may
be biased by the agency's particular policies. Moreover, the principal limita136. In its October 1981 term, the Supreme Court struck down and upheld statewide
voter initiatives limiting the busing of school children, on the basis of distinctions that
not even all the Justices found persuasive. Compare Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No.
1, U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982) (Washington Initiative 350 violates equal protection
clause) with Crawford v. Board of Educ., U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982) (California
Proposition I does not violate fourteenth amendment). The California Supreme Court decided the notorious "use a gun, go to prison" case two different ways within six months.
Compare People v. Tanner, 23 Cal. 8d 16, 587 P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) (reh'g
granted) with People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
137. The most likely reason for inconsistent decisions is a real uncertainty over which
decision is correct under the evidence. See Hazard, supra note 113, at 1041-42.
138. Recently, the Supreme Court in Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24-25 (1980),
expressly chose accuracy and justice of criminal results over consistency of decisions.
139. See Hazard, supra note 113, at 1042.
140. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
141. This is likely the reason for the well-established abandonment of mutuality in
the indemnitor-indemnitee cases. E.g., Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 US. 865 (1950); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14,
9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
142. E.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (collection of
special coal sales tax); United Staets v. Jan Hardware Mfg. Co., 463 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (collection of OSHA fine).
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tion on the application of collateral estoppel, the requirement of a "full and
fair opportunity" to litigate in the earlier action, has been substantially attenuated in recent case law.
Informality of Proceedings
Resolution of a dispute does not require formal court-like proceedings, and
informality is considered a virtue of most administrative proceedings. When,
however, collateral estoppel effect is given issue determinations made in an
administrative proceeding, informality becomes a problem. Judicial proceedings operate within a system where each issue resolved is subject to appellate
review. Parties develop the crucial issues, introduce the important evidence,
and have an independent fact finder resolve legal and evidentiary conflicts. The
reviewability of this process ensures clear and careful issue resolution.
Administrative proceedings are not structured with the same goals in mind
as those of formal court-like proceedings, especially with regard to issue determinations. 14 3 On the federal level, formal administrative adjudications
are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA requires
timely notice of the time and place of the hearing, 14 4 and some opportunity
for cross-examination, presentation of evidence, and legal argument. 145 In
addition, a decision must state findings, conclusions, and rationale for all the
material issues .14G While the Act thus provides some assurance that federal
agencies will determine issues roughly like a court, the APA rules of evidence
differ, cross-examination may be limited, and discovery is not expressly provided for. Agency findings often differ from the APA model. As one critic of
sloppy agency decision-making noted, "[t]he most common defect in agency
findings is their tendency to be couched in vague and obscure terms; abounding in bureaucratic legalisms, they obfuscate rather than clarify."'

4
7

More-

143. Arbitration in particular diverges from the judicial model. Arbitration is often
chosen previsely because it is an informal and inexpensive procedure. United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 365; U.S. 574, 578 (1960). Furthermore, appellate review of an
arbitration award is limited and rare; review of the decisional process leading to an award
is virtually unknown. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960) ("The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements."); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Mutifacs
Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[I]t is the function neither of this court
nor of the district courts to review the record of the arbitration proceeding for errors of law
or fact."); Cothron v. Interinsurance Exch., 103 Cal. App. 3d 853, 860, 163 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244
(1980) ("An award is valid if it settles the entire controversy, and there is no general rule that
an arbitration must either find facts, detail the process by which the result was reached, or
give the reasons behind the award."). Similarly, federal and state arbitration acts provide for
very limited review of awards. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West
1982). See generally Abrams, supra note 117, at 259-62.

144. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1976).
145. Id. § 556(d).
146. Id. § 557(c) (3).
147. B. SCHVARTZ, supra note 44, § 140, at 420-21. For a general discussion and critique
of agency decision-making and fact-finding, see id. § 140-41; E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra
note 44, at 232-33.
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over, findings are often not prepared by the actual administrative decision148
makers but by agency personnel who did not participate in the hearing.
Even these minimal APA standards apply only to a relatively small proportion of federal agency adjudications: those subject to the APA's formal requirements or constitutional due process guarantees. 149 Still other administrative proceedings may be governed by special statutory procedures and minimum
procedural due process requirements. 15° Even so, the bulk of state and federal
administrative decisions are made informally. There is no assurance such determinations will be accompanied by the procedural safeguards provided by
the judicial process. 15
Variety and Multiplicity of
Administrative Decisions
There may be some justification for assuming that one court's determinations are as good as another's on a given issue.' 52 This assumption must be rejected when administrative determinations are the bases for collateral estoppel in judicial actions. Administrative determinations are made in a variety of
federal agencies, state agencies and local bodies, from formal SEC adjudications to personnel decisions by local school boards. 53 Moreover, the number
148. B. ScmvA Tz, supra note 44, at 424-25; E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra note 44, at
233.
149. 5 US.C. § 554(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
US. 33 (1950). Administrative procedures, even on the federal level, may differ as much
from agency to agency as they do from any particular agency to a formal court hearing. E.
GaLLnoRN & B. BOYER, supra note 44, at 180.
150. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (minimum hearing required for minor student
disciplinary sanction).
151. E. GELLuoRN & B. BOYER, supra note 44, at 182. The requirements of administrative
due process are flexible and vary from context to context. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975) (minimum notice and some kind of hearing required for student suspensions up
to 10 days) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (formal trial-type hearing required
before termination of welfare benefits). Constitutional standards of due process currently
are evaluated on the basis of a balancing test. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,128 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
152. It is not safe to make this assumption, even between courts. The Restatement (Second) provides an exception to issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) where warranted by
"differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in two courts or by

factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them."

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND),

supra note 8, § 28(3). A perennial debate continues over the wisdom of giving collateral
estoppel effect to state court determinations in later federal court actions, especially those
involving constitutional rights. Currently the Supreme Court seems to require collateral
estoppel if the determination would have such an effect in a later suit in the courts of
that state under the command of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). See Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Co., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). But see Neuborne, The Myth
of Parity, 90 Huv. L. Rav. 1105 (1977).
153. Reported cases in which administrative determinations have been given collateral
estoppel effect in federal court actions include Steffen v. Housewright, 665 F.2d 245 (8th
Cir. 1981) (Arkansas Claims Commission); United States v. Karlen, 645 F.2d 635 (8th Cir.
1981) (Bureau of Indian Affairs determination); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir. 1978) (National Transportation Safety Board hearing); Spancrete N.E. v. International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 514 F. Supp. 326 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
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of cases handled by administrative adjudication is truly staggering. In fiscal
year 1978, federal administrative law judges conducted more than 200,000
agency adjudications as compared to 125,914 civil cases decided in the federal
district courts.15 4 Because administrative decisions are so vast and varied
it is impossible to catalogue them, much less to sift them for differences in procedure, competence and stature that would warrant distinctions for collateral
estoppel purposes.
Skewed Interests in Administrative Determinations
Administrative determinations are colored by the policies, aims and
sources of authority sustaining the agency decisionmaker. The administrative
agency's hallmark is the possession of both legislative and judicial power which
may be exercised in specialized and narrowly circumscribed areas. 155 Unlike
courts, agencies have tasks other than simply deciding disputes. When an
agency decides disputes in its judicial capacity, it may be influenced by its
specialized legislative authority and the policies that led to its creation. For
example, resolution of tax disputes is guided by federal or state tax policies;
resolution of labor disputes is guided by national labor policy; and resolution
of workers' compensation claims is guided by the compensatory goals that led
to creation of workers' compensation systems. 156 Additional biases in administrative decisions result from a single agency functioning as investigator, prosecutor, and judge.15 7 In sum, the specialized roles of agenciesla8 suggest that
(NLRB hearing determination); Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Va.
1979) (OSHA hearing).
Selected state court cases include People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1982) (AFDC "fair hearing"); City & County of San Francisco v. Leung Fai Wah
Ang, 97 Cal. App. 3d 673, 159 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1979) (San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals).
Courts have also been asked to consider giving collateral estoppel effect to determinations made by other agencies. See, e.g., Lightsey v. Harding, Dahm & Co., 623 F.2d 1219
(7th Cir. 1980) (Indiana Real Estate Commission), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979) (Federal Trade
Commission), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.)
(United States Postal Service) (criminal case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); Nasem v.
Brown, 595 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (U.S. Civil Service Commission's Office of Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity). See also E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra note 44, at 57-58.
154. The administrative agency figure is reported in E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra
note 44, at 182; the federal court figure is from [1978] AD. OFF. ANN. REP., reported in
Clark, supra note 18, at 143. At the end of 1974, there were 804 administrative law judges
in 23 federal agencies, see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 297, as compared to 388 federal
district judges, see Clark, supra note 18, at 71.
155. See E. GELLHORN &.B. BOYER, supra note 44, at 2.
156. Id. at 226-27.
157. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, §§ 108-13 Formal APA hearings at the
federal level require internal separation of prosecutorial or investigative and decisionmaking functions. Id. § 112; 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). However, there are a
number of exceptions to even this provision. See B. ScHWARTz, supra, note 44 § 113. One commentator recently concluded that "[t]he ideal system of separation of functions will never be
found because the perfect balance between the institutional and judicialized decision will
never be found." Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
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administrative determinations are not always disinterested issue resolutions on
the model of the courts.
Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate as an Inadequate
Limitation on Giving Collateral Estoppel Effect
to Administrative Determinations
The foregoing characteristics of administrative determinations suggest they
should be viewed critically before being imported into the judicial decisionmaking process. To limit the collateral estoppel effect of administrative decisions, many courts have restricted the doctrine to parties who had a "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" in the first action. 59 The interpretation of this
regulatory mechanism has been decidedly mixed.
Initially, "full and fair opportunity to litigate" stood for the basic due
process notion that unless a litigant receives notice and an opportunity to be
heard, no valid judgment can be entered affecting the party's interests 11o
Understood in this way, the "opportunity" to offer proof and legal argument
is the essence of due process - the opportunity need not be used and it need
Administrative Agencies, 81 CoLum. L. REv. 759, 805 (1981). Professor Asimow believes that
"[i]n ordinary, formal, accusatory decisionmaking a strict system of separation has long
worked smoothly and is theoretically and practically indispensable," but that elsewhere compromises must be made and that "the problem of separation of functions will never disappear .. . " Id. at 804.
158. Arbitrators are also selected for and supposed to act on the basis of their expertise
in the area of the dispute. For example, some have suggested that labor arbitrators should
resolve disputes based primarily upon the parties' collective bargaining agreement and accepted industrial practices rather than public law and national policies. Abrams, supra
note 117, at 244-49, 248-49 n.86.
159. The Restatement (Second) and prominent cases of the last 20 years have also required that the administrative agency be "acting in a judicial capacity," United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966), or making an "adjudicative determination." REsTATEuMENT (SEco ), supra note 8, § 83(2). In Utah Construction, the Supreme Court
was probably attempting to draw a distinction between agency rule-making and agency
adjudication, considered a fundamental division in administrative law. Compare, e.g., 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (rule-making) with id. § 554 (adjudication). Drawifg
the distinction in practice has proved difficult. See B. ScHwAxrz, supra note 44, § 55; Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78
H..Rv. L. REv. 921, 924 (1965). The Restatement (Second) does not rely on this distinction
in determining which agency proceeding can be given collateral estoppel effect. Rather, it
asks "whether, within the context of the larger purpose of an administrative proceeding, an
issue is formulated as it would be in a court and decided according to procedures similar
to those of a court." REsrATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 8, § 83 comment b. As a result,
courts have looked to see if the agency determination used procedures similar to those employed in typical contested judicial hearings: notice, the right to counsel, to present oral
and written evidence, to cross-examine and to appeal. See Note, supra note 58, at 89-91 and
cases cited therein. These are virtually the identical factors used to determine whether the
parties had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issues, so this requirement adds
little to the analysis.
160. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 8, at 16, 26-27 introductory note; § I comment a;
§ 2 comment a. Generally, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard as
requisites of a valid judgment. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950).
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not mean that one side or the other will win.161 This idea is closely related
to res judicata - a party who has once had the opportunity to litigate a claim,
does not get another opportunity even to present new evidence on neglected
legal theories. Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, rests on the idea that
only issues actually litigated and decided can be preclusive in a second action.
After Bernhard abandoned collateral estoppel's mutuality requirement,
courts and commentators began to use "full and fair opportunity" in another
way. The analytical focus became whether the litigant sought to be estopped
had received an effective opportunity to contest the issue. One commentator
suggested that to assure an "effective opportunity," courts should refuse to
apply nonmutual collateral estoppel whenever the party against whom it was
2
asserted lacked the initiative in the first action.a
Rejecting this blanket rule, courts instead began to focus on the litigation
circumstances in the first action o13 to ensure that the collaterally estopped
161. The emphasis here is on sufficient notice to allow the parties to offer proof and
legal argument. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-62
(1951); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80-82, 92 n.29 (1972). This limitation has been consistently recognized despite the
overthrow of mutuality. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University of Ill
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811-12, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942).
162. Currie, supra note 1, at 308-09. Professor Currie popularized the language, concluding that Bernhard's rejection of mutuality of estoppel should be refined as follows:
(a) that one not a party to the prior action should not be allowed to assert the prior
judgment against one who was a party thereto unless the person against whom the
judgment is asserted in fact had a full, fair and effective opportunity to contest the
issue; and (b) that the plea should not be allowed where its allowance would result
in intolerable anomalies in the administration of justice.
Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
Currie was concerned with defendants who lost on an issue that was being asserted against
them by someone not a party to the first action under circumstances where the defendant
had no control over the time and place of the first action. Only when a party loses after
choosing the time and place is it fair to say, as Justice Traynor does in Bernhard, that
"it would be unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen identical issues
by merely switching adversaries." 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. Rejecting a kind of
"defendant's option," Currie suggested, "[a]ll the defendant needs to offset that advantage
[strategic use of the initiative by plaintiff] is a full and fair opportunity to defend in a realistic sense (as distinguished from an opportunity which meets the minimal requirements of
due process and supports the jurisdiction of the court)." Currie, supra note 1, at 303 (emphasis
added). See also Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. Rav. 25, 28 (1965).
He specifically rejected placing the burden of showing actual detrimental effects on the
party resisting collateral estoppel, choosing ease of administration over a particularized rule.
The courts, however, have chosen differently.
163. In Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), for example, Judge Friendly
inquired whether Glidden "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue effectively,"
but the question whether that party lacked the initiative was severed and discarded. Id.
at 956. See also Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606-07, 375 P.2d
439, 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962). These cases recognize two elements that go into a
full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue: incentive to contest and procedural protections. In Zdanok, the Second Circuit noted that the Alexander case (in which plaintiffs were
seeking to apply collateral estoppel) had already been filed in state court when the
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party had enjoyed exemplary procedural fairness. Eventually, however, the
intensity of the courts' focus on the circumstances of the first litigation dedined. Instead, courts seized upon a finding that a party had a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate an issue, and used it to preclude the party from litigating that issue in any subsequent litigation.64 Some courts have even gone
one step further (and in a sense come full drce), holding that a party who
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue is precluded from litigating it in subsequent actions. Under this rationale, collateral estoppel is
applied even when the issue was never actually litigated in the first action. 165
This not only strips the full and fair opportunity requirement of any effecZdanok case was litigated and "was known by everyone to be lurking in the wings." 327
F.2d at 956. Thus, by implication, the common defendant, the Glidden Company, had special
incentive to litigate the Zdanok case. Further evidence was the actual vigor of the defense
including an appeal taken to the Supreme Court. In Teitelbaum Furs, the incentive to make
a vigorous and effective defense was the possibility of felony convictions punishable by terms
in state prison. 58 Cal. 2d 606-07, 375 P.2d at 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
Procedurally, the Second Circuit noted that the forum was an "entirely reasonable" one,
partly the resuli of Glidden's choice (federal versus state court), where it was able partially
to consolidate its defense against several plaintiffs, and that nothing in the result "turned
on personal sympathy or any other consideration relating specifically to those five plaintiffs
as distinguished from the other employees." 827 F.2d at 956. The California Supreme Court
was satisfied that Teitelbaum had enjoyed "all the safeguards afforded the criminal defendant," thus receiving the requisite procedural super-fairness. 58 Cal. 2d 606-07, 375 P.2d
at 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 561. Professor Currie pronounced himself satisfied with these decisions and repudiated his own blanket initiative limitation. Currie, supra note 162, at 29, 31.
164. Regrettably, this tendency is most pronounced in recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. For example, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313 (1971), poses the question of whether to apply collateral estoppel against a
party who has once litigated and lost the issue of the validity of a patent held by it this
way: "The broader question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more
than one full and fair opporutnity for judicial resolution of the same issue." Id. at 328.
In Blonder-Tongue, however, the earlier action was unquestionably a full and actual litigation of plaintiff's patent's validity, initiated and prosecuted by plaintiff. University of Ill.
Found. v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 125 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
More recently, in discussing the full faith and credit due state court judgments in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976), the Court was careful to distinguish between the minimum procedural due process required by the fourteenth amendment and limitations on collateral estoppel "when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a
'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the claim or issue." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 480-81 (1982).
165. See, e.g., Moore v. Bonner, 526 F. Supp. 148, 150 n.9 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d
799 (4th Cir 1982); Palma v Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Professor Vestal has
embraced this development and suggested that issue preclusion generally should be available
without actual litigation if there was incentive and opportunity to litigate. He suggests
the rule should be: "(a) When a party has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate, a
judgment against the party is preclusive on any issue whose determination is necessary for
the decision, except as provided in (b). (b) [Exceptions]." Dissent, supra note 27, at 496.
See generally Dissent, supra note 27, at 466-97; Vestal, Issue Preclusionand Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IowA L. Ra v. 281, 288-89, 294-97 (1980).
His position prompted a spirited reply from the Reporter for the Restatement (Second)
who argued that Professor Vestal's position is unsound, unjustified by the existing case
law, and results in "serious mischief." Hazard, supra note 37, at 574-84.
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tiveness as an additional limitation on collateral estoppel, it is contrary to the
doctrine's basic premise - actual litigation of issues.
The evisceration of the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" limitation is
especially evident when administrative determinations are the source of issue
resolutions, where the restriction is most needed. Courts accord this test strikingly different treatment. One group of decisions carefully reviews the administrative proceeding to determine whether its procedures were adequate and
fair to the party who would be precluded. Here collateral estoppel effect is
ordinarily denied to the administrative determination. 166 Another group summarily concludes that the administrative proceedings had the trappings of
a judicial forum and the party sought to be precluded knew what was at
stake. These courts allow the administrative determinations collateral estoppel
effect. 167 In yet another approach, courts focus more on the opportunities to
litigate - what the party sought to be precluded could have done - in deciding whether to foreclose litigation on the basis of the administrative determination.168

In sum, the "full and fair opportunity" limitation on using administrative
determinations as sources for collateral estoppel is inadequate. Current rules
provide no assurance that collateral estoppel will be limited to circumstances
where the administrative proceeding was procedurally equivalent to a judicial
trial; where the parties knew the determinations could be used later in court;
where enough was at stake in the administrative adjudication to assure it would
be contested fully; and where the party to be precluded was not at a procedural
or substantive disadvantage due to the nature of the administrative forum. In
fact, with stress being placed on opportunity to litigate, the dangers of precluding parties who have never actually litigated the issue from raising it later in
court are increasing. A different approach is needed.
PROPOSALS FOR A RECONSIDERED LAW OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

The grounds usually offered to justify giving administrative determinations
collateral estoppel effect do not support their wide application in judicial proceedings. Neither history nor case law provides a foundation for the generous

166. E.g., Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (inadequate procedural safeguards, particularly absence of live witness testimony); Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 512 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Mass. 1981) (limited ability to discover and present
evidence; interested tribunal); Zaika v. Del E. Webb Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Nev. 1981)
(lack of right to appeal); Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (too
little at stake for incentive to litigate vigorously; plaintiff was unaware of importance of
her role in the proceedings); Lewis v. IBM Corp., 393 F. Supp. 305 (D. Ore. 1974) (too
little at stake for incentive to litigate vigorously).
167. E.g., United States v. Karlen, 645 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1981); Pettus v. American
Airlines, 587 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1978); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978);
Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
168. E.g., Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Bonner, 526
F. Supp. 143 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1982); Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F.
Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (arbitration findings given collateral estoppel effect).
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invocation of collateral estoppel promoted by the Restatement Second's approach. Although there is considerable merit in several of its restrictive rules, 16 9
there is a need to reconsider its premises and starting point in their area.
Any approach to granting collateral estoppel effect for administrative determinations should begin with a rebuttable presumption that no such effect
will be given the determinations.170 The vagaries of the administrative process
and the dangers attendant on application of collateral estoppel caution against
following the current trend's presumption that administrative determinations
will be given preclusive effect. Such effect should be given only when there is
a good reason for it. The best reason for using collateral estoppel is to avoid
relitigating an administrative ruling in a later judicial proceeding. Such rationale corresponds to the true res judicata objective of securing final judgments. 17 The other clear need for collateral estoppel is to protect and promote
the parties' expectation that the administrative determination would bind
them in later judicial actions. This corresponds to the original historical
source of collateral estoppel1 72
Even if good reasons exist for giving collateral estoppel effect to administrative findings, procedural and statutory requirements must still be met.
3
Thus, the agency must have been acting in an adjudicative capacity;7 collateral estoppel must not circumvent legislative policy that requires expeditious administrative proceedings 74 or that permits relitigation in the second
proceeding. 7 5 Issues of law can be relitigated when substantially unrelated
claims are involved 7 6 or when necessary to avoid inequitable administration
169. Taken seriously, the various safeguards and limitations in Restatement (Second)
§§ 27, 28, 29, 83 and 84 could produce a reasoned and restrained use of collateral estoppel for administrative determinations and arbitral findings. The problem is that when
applied in actual cases, they have not. See text accompanying notes 160-168 supra.
170. In effect, this simply reverses the Restatement (Second) approach. RESTATENMENT
(SEcOND), supra note 8, § 83. This section begins by stating its presumption in favor of res
judicata and collateral estoppel: "(1) Except as stated in subsections (2), (3), and (4), a
valid and final adjudication by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the
rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a
court." Id. The Restatement (Second) takes the position that when "an administrative
forum has the essential procedural characteristics of a court, . . . its determinations should
be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court." Id. at 269 Therefore,
it places administrative adjudications generally on a par with those of courts. See, id.,
comments a, b, c, f, & h. Similar and parallel treatment is accorded arbitration awards by
section 84. Id. § 84.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83(1), (2) & comments b & c, § 84(3)(b) &
comments c S-f. See also United States v. Utah Constr. 8- Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
174. ,rErATnMNT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83(4)(a), comments h & g & illustration 13.
See also Lewis v. IBM Corp., 393 F. Supp. 305 (D. Or. 1974); Kelly v. Trans Globe
Travel Bureau, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 195, 131 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1976).
175. RrSTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83(4)(b), comment h Scillustration 14. See
also NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Porter & Dietsch,
Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979). Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974) (arbitration award).
176. REsrATEbMNT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83 comment h, § 28(2) comment b, illustration 2.
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of the law1 77 In addition, issues may be relitigated when the government is
the party sought to be precluded, where a remedial scheme is affected, where
other parties may be prejudiced, or where the legal rules involved need reconsideration. 17 8 Moreover, since administrative proceedings are so diverse,
and perhaps unfamiliar to the court, the court should insist on convincing
proof that all of the traditional collateral estoppel requirements are satisfied. 1 9 With the burden of proof on the party asserting collateral estoppel, if
any doubt exists, collateral estoppel should be denied.
Denying preclusive effect in later court proceedings does not mean that
administrative determinations should be wholly ignored. In many cases such
findings should still be admitted as evidence.18 0 A similar approach already
177. Id. § 83 comment h, § 2:3 comment c, illustrations 3 & 4. See also Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83 comment h, § 29(1), (6) & (7) comment i.
See also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
179. The traditional collateral estoppel requirements are that the same issue was actually litigated and necessary to a valid final administrative judgment. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 comments c-e, g-k. The party asserting collateral estoppel
has the burden of proving that these requirements have been met. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 11, § 68 comment k; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 comment f; see also
Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969); DeWitt v.
Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967). Cf. United States v. Lasky, 600
F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir.) (criminal case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979). See generally 18
C. WRIGHT, A. 'MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4405 (1981).
It is particularly difficult to decide whether the same issue in administrative determinations
was involved before the "applying" court. Because of differences between a particular agency's
jurisdiction and purposes and courts of general jurisdiction, an agency finding may superficially appear identical to that in the court action, but in fact, involve entirely different assessments of different evidence for a different purpose. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E.
Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (different meaning of "foreign commerce"), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). Several different sections of the Restatement (Second) deal indirectly with this problem. E.g., RESTATEmENT (SECOND), supra note 8, §§ 27, 28(3), 29(2) & (8).
The section most suited to be applied here, § 28(3), unfortunately seems restricted by its
comments to the single question of different levels of courts and the idea of an "incidental
determination" of an issue by a court without jurisdiction to determine it directly. See id. § 28
comments d & e. In contrast, the reporter's note deals broadly, though inconclusively, with these
concerns stating: "There does not appear to be any way in which the wide range of cases
on this subject can be reconciled." Id. § 28 reporter's note.
Section 28(3) itself is exceedingly vague, allowing relitigation of an issue meeting § 27's
criteria when: " (3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the
quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating
to the allocation of jurisdiction between them ....
The reporter cites the views expressed
by several commentators and in a number of decisions, "in varying degrees and with a
variety of shadings," to support this formulation. Id. § 28(3) reporter's note.
Literal adherence to the rule of § 71 of the first Restatement, before its amendment in
1948, from which § 28(3) is derived, would preclude giving collateral estoppel effect to most
administrative findings in later suits in courts of general jurisdiction where judgments are
sought that could not be awarded in the administrative proceeding. Id.
Extrinsic evidence should be available to help the court determine whether the collateral
estoppel elements are satisfied. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 68 comment k (1942 & Supp.
1948); RESTATIMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 comment f. Cf. Seaboard Air Line R.R.
v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., 277 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1960).
180. Independently, and in an almost offhand fashion, several commentators have re-
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exists in several subject matter area of federal law. In the antitrust field, for
example, a final judgment in a proceeding brought by the government is admissible as prima fade evidence in a later private civil action against the
same defendant.3'8 Determinations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and other agencies are admissible in federal Title VII litigation.8 2
Administrative agencies frequently admit the record and findings of earlier,
related proceeding as evidence in subsequent proceedings.1 83 A similar scheme
should be extended to administrative determinations that do not qualify for
collateral estoppel treatment in later judicial litigation. Thus, administrative
findings would be admissible as evidence in the subsequent proceeding, subject to the usual rules of evidence, 84 applicable statutes, and general limitations of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
This proposal would temper the excesses of administrative collateral estoppel cases without entirely barring the use of administrative findings in later
judicial proceedings. Collateral estoppel was not necessary in Gear, Bowen,
or even Parklane to protect the finality of the earlier administrative determinations. Gear's Title VII action would not have disturbed the resolution of
her claim for unemployment benefits. Awarding Bowen damages in his tort
action would not affect his license suspension. Likewise, treating Parklane's
injunctive proceedings as a form of administrative proceedings, the government's relief against the company would not have been affected by relitigating
cently thrown out this suggestion. See J. LANDras & J. MARTIN, supra note 118, at 918 n.1;
Berch, supra note 113, at 532 n. 103. This approach is also suggested in Southern Pac. R.R.
v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 57 (1897).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Antitrust Procedural Improvements
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154 amended this section to allow earlier judgments to be given full collateral estoppel effect as well. Interestingly, this amendment also
specifically prohibited giving such collateral estoppel effect to administrative agency findings
under the antitrust laws. See H.R. REP. No. 874, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2752. This example, and its possible expansion into other
areas, is discussed in Berch, supra note 113, at 532 n.103.
182. E.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 & n.39 (1976) (admissible under
FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(c)); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1978);
Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 156-58 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversible error to refuse
to admit EEOC report; admissible under the Federal Business Records Act, 28 US.C. § 1732
(1976)).
183. See, e.g. Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally
Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971

Doaa L.J. 1. Federal administrative agencies operate under the relaxed APA evidence rule.

5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
184. F a. R. Evm. 803(8) makes admissible as exempt from the hearsay rule "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" in civil
actions and proceedings and against the government in criminal cases. See also id. 803(22), (23)
(judgments of previous conviction and personal, family or general history or boundaries
admissible as evidence under limited circumstances). This exception was intended to include
a variety of factual and evaluative agency findings. At least this was the intent of the Ad.
visory Committee on Rule of Evidence which noted that various kinds of evaluative agency
reports are admissible under federal statutory law. Cf. id. 802 (preserving these statutory
exceptions). See id. 803(8) advisory committee notes and examples cited therein. In enacting
the Rules of Evidence, Congress may have taken a more restrictive position. See S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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the proxy deficiencies in the stockholders' damage action. These litigants never
agreed that the administrative determinations would bind them in later litigation - civil or criminal. Collateral estoppel was unnecessary in these cases
to protect res judicata finality interests.
Moore is more complex. Allowing her to relitigate the discriminatory dismissal claims would have directly undermined one of the administrative determinations. The relitigation, however, would not have affected the favorable
determination made regarding her unemployment benefits. The real question
is whether she ever actually "litigated" her constitutional claims before the
school board. The board's limited jurisdiction (whether there were grounds
for not renewing her contract); the likelihood of procedural unfairness and
limitations; and the legislature's arguable intent not to foreclose racial discrimination claims by administrative proceedings alone, all evidence the need
to allow Moore to relitigate her discrimination claims in federal court. 18 5
Nevertheless, in each of these cases, the earlier findings and determinations
could be used appropriately as evidence in later judicial actions. The FAA
findings do suggest Bowen was negligent, and in Parklane, the judgment for
the United States is virtually conclusive on the issue of deficient proxy materials. The school board's findings are almost certainly admissible in Moore's
federal suit to demonstrate intentional discrimination or lack of it.186 Finally,
the unemployment compensation agency's findings are relevant to Gear's
sexual discrimination claims.
Asking the courts to consider whether each potential application of collateral estoppel would advance res judicata principles imposes an additional
preliminary burden on the trial courts. The decision to apply collateral estoppel may require an evidentiary hearing. Hence, judicial time may be lost.
Moreover such decisions, even if within the court's discretion, may be increasingly appealed. 87 Admitting administrative determinations for evidentiary purposes may also consume additional court time, both in deciding
whether to admit the evidence, and in weighing it with the other evidence
at trial. Trial courts may well balk at drawing these fine distinctions and choose
to err on the side of allowing relitigation. If so, the often-heard, but seldomrealized, dangers of conflicting decisions, wasteful relitigation, and harassment
may be increased. Still, this seems little reason to keep the courts from their
first task - resolution of the parties' dispute on the merits of the evidence they
present to the court. In a thoroughly litigated case, the additional authority
of the process itself lends weight to the court's decision. 8
CONCLUSION

Collateral estoppel works best when it reinforces the finality value of res
185. The Fourth Circuit seems to have found these arguments more persuasive. Moore v.
Bonner, 695 F.2d 799, 800-02 (1982). Cf. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978);
REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83 illustrations 8, 13 & 14.
186. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
187. See Holland, supra note 9, at 639-44.
188. F. JAMES & G HAZARD, supra note 8, § 1.2, at 5.
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judicata. Historically, this was its central role. Cases like Cromwell prevented
relitigation of settled issues when judicial resolution of a dispute required piecemeal litigation. Collateral estoppel was also properly invoked to prevent a
party from relitigating a claim by finding a new adversary against whom to
assert the identical claim.
When collateral estoppel no longer serves the goal of finality, its primary
justification changes to the problematic goal of judicial economy. The doctrine has some use in preventing wasteful relitigation of a question whose
character remains constant even when different adversaries are involved. But,
when even judicial economy is no longer necessarily invoked, it is important
to ask why collateral estoppel should be involved at all. Courts should not
save time at the expense of their primary function, resolution of disputes on
their merits, unless other purposes of the judicial process are also served.
Extending collateral estoppel by "merely logical processes of manipulation"
threatens to vitiate orderly dispute resolution.8 9 Such extensions occur when
courts use administrative findings to preclude full judicial litigation on the
merits. Ordinarily there is simply no need to do this. The conclusiveness and
effectiveness of administrative processes are fully protected by res judicata.
Unfairness to the parties before the court can be prevented by applying limited
collateral estoppel effect when one party seeks to reopen a dispute resolved
in an administrative proceeding.
Denying preclusive effect to administrative proceedings will not swamp
our judicial system. The time savings from collateral estoppel have been overemphasized. It will, however, eliminate a potential source of unfairness. Litigation before an administrative tribunal simply is not the equivalent of litigation in court. Agencies, with their legislative and judicial powers, serve purposes other than disinterested resolution of disputes. A court can never verify
whether such powers skewed the administrative adjudication such that the
issue resolution should not be accorded the respect given it to issues determined
by courts.9 0
Although most administrative determinations should not be given full preclusive effect as collateral estoppel, they can be given their due. These determinations and the underlying record ought to be respected for what they are evidence, no more and no less. A judge or other factfinder, applying the usual
rules of evidence, can admit them, refuse to admit them, or admit them for limited purposes. Giving these determinations a role in the court's resolution of
the parties' dispute preserves the province of the judicial process and does not
detract from the proper role of administrative adjudication.
189. Currie, supra note 1, at 289.
190. See Niles v. Niles, 701 Del. Ch. 1955, 111 A.2d 697, 701 (1955).
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